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Trespass and Expressive Rights
By. W. Wesley Pue

… the rights guaranteed in the Charter erect around each
individual, metaphorically speaking, an invisible fence over
which the state will not be allowed to trespass. The role of
the courts is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters of the
fence.
•

R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at p. 164,
per Wilson J.

Paper prepared for The Ipperwash Inquiry, The Honourable Sidney B. Linden,
Commissioner, established by the Government of Ontario on November 12, 2003, under
the Public Inquiries Act to inquire and report on events surrounding the death of Dudley
George, shot during a protest by First Nations representatives at Ipperwash Provincial Park
in 1995.
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Introduction
This paper investigates the authority of police, acting on their own initiative or at
the request of others, to exercise control over individuals or groups of people who have
assembled for the purpose of expressing their views on matters of concern to them. It
involves a review of issues arising with respect to both the sorts of measures that might be
taken proactively in order to bar people from entry to particular areas at particular times,
and the sorts of reactive measures that may be taken to remove people from a particular
place after they are already there.
A recent incident serves to give texture to the otherwise abstract legal issues.
The Summit of the Americas, 2001
In the spring of 2001 two senior citizens of respectable demeanor and remarkable
life-long accomplishments were tear-gassed by police as they walked together through
Quebec City. The couple was on a public street and fully complying with the law when this
happened. They had traveled from a small community north of Toronto in order to observe
the “Summit of the America’s” conference. They had been enjoying a summer’s day in the
midst of a good-humoured and peaceable, though perhaps sometimes boisterous, street life.
Although the event had generated sizable “anti-globalization” protests, the two seniors,
were distinctly not of the rent-a-mob ilk. Neither was “the sort” to provoke trouble with
authorities and neither, in fact, opposed globalization. One of them, the Honorable Sinclair
Stevens, explained:
There aren't many people in this country who view free trade as positively as
I do. As industry minister in the Mulroney government, I participated in the 1985
Shamrock Summit that set the stage for our trade agreement with the United States.
I was even responsible for replacing the Foreign Investment Review Agency with
Investment Canada, a welcome mat for our partners to the South.
There also aren't many people who view the maintenance of law and order
as a higher priority than I do.1

1

Sinclair Stevens, “A police state in the making”, The Globe and Mail, Tuesday, April 24, 2001.
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Mr. Stevens, is a member of Her Majesty’s Privy Council. He had served as a Progressive
Conservative Member of Parliament from 1972 to 1988, as President of the Treasury
Board, and as minister of Regional Industrial Expansion in the government of Prime
Minister Mulroney. He was one of the architects of the North American Free Trade
Agreement.2
On learning that police had erected a “security” fence designed to create a large nogo zone in central Quebec City, Mr. Stevens and his wife, Noreen, had set off to explore.
They at first found the sight of a police riot squad stationed behind the fence to be
unthreatening albeit daunting to behold (“helmets, masks, shields and assorted elaborate
weapons”). Further on however - and well away from the security zone – their
conversations with peaceful protesters were interrupted by the “eerie drumming” of police
riot sticks being beaten against their shields. Mr. and Mrs. Stevens moved aside as police
advanced and as protesters sat passively on the road. From near at hand they witnessed
police fire “tear gas canisters directly at those sitting or standing on the road”. The gas
spread until the Stevens’ too suffered its effects: “I never thought I would ever see this
kind of police-state tactic in Canada.” The next day, however, they witnessed more
aggressive police behaviour:
This time, we walked along the fence until we reached the gate at René
Lévesque Boulevard, where a great crowd had gathered…. I was asked for an
interview by a CBC crew but, before we could begin, dozens of tear gas canisters
were fired, water cannons were sprayed and rubber bullets began to hit people
nearby. Three times, I felt I could not breathe, my eyes were sore and all I could do
was run. In the bedlam, my wife and I were separated for almost three hours. She
said she had almost passed out from the gassing.
… This government, and some reporters, like to brand the Quebec City
demonstrators as "hooligans." That is not fair. I talked to dozens of them, mostly
university students, aged about 20. They came to Quebec, not to have "a good
time," as some suggest, but to express their well-thought-out views on a subject that
is important to them, to all of us.

2

See: http://www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/welcomeic.nsf/ICPages/HistoryMinisters
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I may not have agreed with their position, but I sure believe in their right to
express it. The police had no cause to violently suppress it.
Some will say that a handful of demonstrators got out of hand and forced the
police to take collective action. I can't agree. The police action in Quebec City,
under orders from our government, was a provocation itself -- an assault on all our
freedoms. 3
Legal Issues
Large scale public policing events such as this raise important issues:
1) Under what lawful authority do police erect fences or barricades so as to
create police exclusion zones?
2) By what right and under what circumstances are police entitled to use
force in clearing people off public streets?
3) How do basic civil liberties including the right to move freely about
public streets, the right of free expression, and the right of assembly
intersect with the need to preserve the peace, protect life and property,
and prevent crime?
These questions go to the core of what it means to live in a free society governed in
accordance with the principles of constitutionalism, liberal democracy, and the rule of law.
Core values are at stake whenever the police act against protesters. This is not, however,
because we approve of any particular protest movement. Rather, constitutional liberty is
founded on freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and the freedom to express
oneself in the company of like-minded people – freedom of assembly. Although each of
these sound like “rights” of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) sort,
their constitutional importance precedes the Charter and is greater than it.4 They have
3

Stevens, “police state”, Op. Cit. If Mr. Stevens’ suspicion that police responded to political
directives from the government were correct, an important cornerstone of civil liberties - the
principle of non-partisan policing - was severely corroded. See W. Wesley Pue, “Policing, the Rule
of Law, and Accountability in Canada: Lessons from the APEC Summit”, in W. Wesley Pue, ed.,
Pepper in Our Eyes. The APEC Affair (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000);
Pue, “The Prime Minister’s Police? Commissioner Hughes’ APEC report” 39(1) Osgoode Hall Law
Journal, 2001, 165-185.
4
The pre-Charter origins of constitutional protection for free expression, for example, registers
strongly in Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé reasons delivered in Committee for the Commonwealth
of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, [1991] S.C.J. No. 3 , wherein pre-Charter authorities
including the following are cited: Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285; Reference Re Alberta
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emerged from centuries of constitutional development that Canada shares with the United
Kingdom, the USA, and other liberal democracies. Just as it is possible to have bad laws,
so too legislation or state action may be technically “Charter-proof” in the sense of being so
constructed as to be effectively immunized from court challenge and yet still be offensive to
core constitutional values. Eminent USA jurist Benjamin Cardozo viewed freedom of
expression as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom",5 while Canadian Supreme Court Justice L'Heureux-Dubé has pointed out that
[t]he alternatives are particularly frightening. History is replete with examples of
entrenched groups which have sought to maintain their elevated station by
suppressing emerging and challenging new thoughts and ideas. Stifling opponents
by revoking their right to express dissent and disenchantment may have produced
desired results in the short run, but ultimately all such attempts led to insurrection
and rebellion. As Brandeis J. proclaimed in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927), at pp. 375-76, such oppressive endeavours are incompatible with the
democratic vision which inspired the United States Constitution and the rights
enunciated therein:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties .... They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of
happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty .... Believing in the power
of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law -- the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution
so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 6
It is important to recognize, too, their character as values, as opposed to rules,
habituated behaviour, or sociological facts. Values operate in juxtaposition to each other
and are infrequently entirely in agreement one with another. The values of a free and
democratic society do not all run in one direction. One value might be hard to reconcile
Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100; Boucher v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265; Saumur v. City of Quebec,
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455.
5
Cardozo J., for the United States Supreme Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), at
p. 327, as cited by Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé, Commonwealth of Canada, para. 62.
6
Commonwealth of Canada, per L'Heureux-Dubé, para. 70.
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with other, equally genuine, societal values. In recognition of the complexity attaching to
such matters section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms prescribes that
“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.” These simple words have provided much grist
for the lawyerly mill. The common law, for its part, has for centuries engaged in similar
deliberative exercises in evaluating the extent of liberty.
Values come into conflict and legal rules lack precision in the area of public protest.
One person’s right to assembly necessarily interferes with another person’s freedoms.
Speaking loosely, some disturbance of the “peace” occurs almost as a necessary incident of
public protest. Access to public and private property is impeded, and the peaceable
enjoyment of land or other property is not infrequently disrupted. Any large gathering
creates an obstacle to passage for others who would otherwise enjoy a less inhibited
freedom of movement. This is true for individuals who, for example, might wish to walk
through a public square jammed full of protesters and also for competing groups whose
desire to express their views publicly, effectively, and in large numbers cannot be fulfilled
at the same place and time as others. Moreover, crowds, even overwhelmingly law-abiding
ones, can provide cover for hooligans, vandals or trouble-makers and, perhaps, for
individuals intent on criminal assault or worse. Though officials cannot be allowed to
trump civil rights merely by incanting “security”, Canadian law does not hold that valued
liberties can never be limited in the cause of security.
Issues such as these have frequently arisen in the context of so-called “antiglobalization” protests and in circumstances involving assertions of aboriginal rights
claims. The most fully documented event in recent decades was the 1997 meeting of the
leaders of Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation economies in Vancouver. The event
generated a modestly large protest, strong police action, enormous media commentary,
political reaction, litigation, scholarship, and an inquiry by the Commission for Public
Complaints against the RCMP.7 It was unique not so much for what happened on the day
7

Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, RCMP Act -- Part VII Subsection
45.45(14), Commission Interim Report Following a Public Hearing Into the Complaints regarding
the events that took place in connection with demonstrations during the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference in Vancouver, B.C., in November 1997 at the UBC Campus and Richmond
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but because some individuals who felt aggrieved were able to muster the resources needed
to demand an accounting. Most often, protesters lack the resources or stamina necessary to
pursue even their most deeply-felt sense of grievance. Because prosecutors usually drop
ill-conceived charges there is typically no possibility for either judicial review or other
independent oversight of police or government actions in such circumstances.
“Authorized By Law”
A common policing tactic at major events and demonstrations is to erect fences or
barricades designed to channel the movement of people while enclosing certain sites or
territory behind a sort of “police exclusion zone”. Surprisingly, such measures are
normally taken in the absence of any explicit statutory authority. The operating assumption
has been that they are permitted as powers necessarily incidental to long-established duties
of peace officers to protect life and property, preserve the peace, prevent crime, and
apprehend offenders. The first important legal question to be addressed is the extent of the
common law police powers that lie behind this sort of police tactic.
R. v. Knowlton
The leading authority on these matters arose when a very modest policing event
found its way before the Supreme Court of Canada a quarter century before Vancouver’s
APEC summit. The incident before the Court in R. v. Knowlton ,8 occurred in Edmonton
during a visit by the Soviet Union’s Premier Kosygin. Earlier in his Canadian tour Mr.
Kosygin had been attacked by an unarmed man while walking on Parliament Hill with
Prime Minister Trudeau. Although quickly rescued by the intervention of the Canadian
Prime Minister,9 officials realized that the minor incident could have been something quite
different had the attacker been armed, more determined, more powerful, or more vicious.
Fearing a recurrence, Edmonton police created a security zone of sorts around a downtown

detachments of the RCMP (Ottawa: CPC RCMP, 31 July 2001); W. Wesley Pue, “The Prime
Minister’s Police?:, Op. Cit. ; W. Wesley Pue, "Executive Accountability and the APEC Inquiry:
Comment on `Ruling on Applications to Call Additional Government Witnesses'" (2000) 34 UBC
Law Review, 335-344; W. Wesley Pue, "The Rule of Law, APEC, & Canada" 56 (2) The Advocate
(March, 1998) 217-220; W. Wesley Pue, Feature "Who sent in the police?" Times Higher
Education Supplement (October 16, 1998, 18-19); W. Wesley Pue, "Why the APEC allegations are
so serious" Globe and Mail, October 5, 1998; Pue, Pepper in Our Eyes, Op. Cit.
8
R. v. Knowlton, [1974] S.C.R. 443
9
John McKay, “Trudeau Left Indelible Impressions With everyone he touched, even reporters”
(Can. Press, Sun., Oct. 1, 2000), http://cgi.canoe.ca/CNEWSTrudeauNews/01001_trudeau6-cp.html
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hotel to be visited by the Soviet Premier. Only individuals authorized by police were
allowed to enter the hotel property. As part of their efforts to secure the site, however,
police also obstructed a small portion of the sidewalk on an adjacent public street. E.J.N.
Knowlton took the view that this amounted to an unlawful police interference with his right
to move freely on a public street:
The police had cordoned off an area in front of the entrance of a hotel where
Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. was to make a short stop. The appellant indicated
to two constables that he wanted to take pictures and stated that he wished to
proceed along that part of the sidewalk which was in the cordoned off area. Because
of the appellant's forceful insistence on his right to enter that area, he was warned
that if he did, he would be arrested. He refused to take heed of this warning and
pushed his way between two constables. He was then arrested.10
The case was heard because charges of obstructing a peace officer were pressed. Though it
is generally imprudent to confront police officers in these ways, Knowlton had good reason
for thinking as he did. Provincial Judge J. Rennie acquitted him on the grounds that
the police at the relevant time were not enforcing any provisions of the Criminal
Code, or any by-law or other law and that therefore they were not acting in the
execution of their duty and that therefore the accused could not have been
obstructing them and therefore not guilty of the offence of obstruction. Finding as I
do there was not any law being enforced the accused could not have been found
committing an offence so as to justify an arrest without a warrant and therefore the
charge is dismissed.11
The learned trial judge had in effect based his decision on the foundation stone of the
Canadian constitution. The classic formulation of the principle of the rule of law was
provided by Albert Venn Dicey in his Law of the Constitution:
….

no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except

for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the
ordinary Courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every

10
11

Knowlton, headnote.
as cited in Supreme Court of Canada judgment.
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system of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide,
arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint. 12
In Dicey’s language we might say that Judge Rennie’s judgment was based on the finding
that there had been no “distinct breach of law”. To the extent that police sought to punish
Knowlton for doing something that was both generally permissible and in the particular
circumstances not expressly forbidden under any common law rule or statute, their actions
would be unlawful – well beyond the bounds of Canadian constitutionalism.
In the Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Fauteux, for a unanimous bench,13
acknowledged the principle that police power does not float free of common law and
statute. He accepted the fact that the police had interfered with the “liberty of the
appellant” including his undoubted legal “right to circulate freely on a public street”.14
Even while confirming these general principles, however, the Court upheld police action in
the particular circumstances. The reason was that the trial judge had not properly taken
into account the ancient common law duties of “constables” to preserve the peace and to
prevent crime, duties which are imported into the Canadian Criminal Code and legislation
governing various police forces across Canada. Chief Justice Fauteux pointed to the
Alberta Police Act:
Section 26(1) of the Alberta Police Act (1971), c. 85, assigns to a member of a
municipal police force, within the limits of the municipality, all the powers and
duties of a member of the Provincial Police Force under Part I of the Statute.
Section 2(1) of Part I provides for the establishment of a Provincial Police
Force "... for the preservation of peace, order and public safety, the enforcement
of law and the prevention of crime ...". And section 3(1) of Part I states, in part,
that:
3. (1) Every member of the Alberta Provincial Police has the power and it
shall be his duty to
(a) perform all duties that are assigned to police officers in relation
to
12

Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction To The Study Of The Law Of The Constitution (8th Edition),
1914, Chapter 4, p.
13
Fauteux C.J. and Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Hall, Spence, Pigeon and Laskin JJ.
14
Knowlton
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(i) the preservation of peace,
(ii) the prevention of crime and of offences against the laws in
force in Alberta, and
(iii) the apprehension of criminals and offenders and others
who may lawfully be taken into custody.15
In light of the earlier assault on the Soviet Premier, the Court thought it reasonable for
police to seek to guard against further disturbance of the peace or criminal assault. In a key
passage Mr. Justice Fauteaux explained:
… these official authorities were not only entitled but in duty bound, as peace
officers, to prevent a renewal of a like criminal assault on the person of Premier
Kosygin during his official visit in Canada. In this respect, they had a specific
and binding obligation to take proper and reasonable steps. The restriction of
the right of free access of the public to public streets, at the strategic point
mentioned above, was one of the steps--not an unusual one--which police
authorities considered and adopted as necessary for the attainment of the
purpose aforesaid. In my opinion, such conduct of the police was clearly falling
within the general scope of the duties imposed upon them. 16
The Court’s view, in sum, was that the police obstruction of a small stretch of sidewalk was
permissible under the general authority of constables to preserve the peace, prevent crime,
protect public safety, preserve order, and prevent offences against provincial laws. The
court also thought it proper for police to screen people passing through a security barricade,
to selectively bar some individuals from entry, and to issue “passes” for those who were
able to satisfy police as to their background, intentions, and objectives. On the facts
however this amounts to little more than saying that police can refuse entry to private
property if that is the wish of the owner. The only purpose a person could have had for
going beyond the police barricades in Knowlton – apart, perhaps, from positioning oneself
slightly better for the purposes of taking a picture, as Mr. Knowlton contended - was to
enter onto the private property of the hotel.

15
16

Knowlton
Knowlton
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Taken at its widest, and out of the context of the facts which were before the Court,
Mr. Justice Fauteux’s words might seem to imply a virtual carte blanche for police officers
to do whatever they want, whenever they want, to whomever they want - provided only that
the objective of their otherwise offensive behaviour fits within extraordinarily wide
parameters. When, after all, would police officers resorting to unusually severe measures
not claim to be acting for reasons related to preserving the peace, preventing crime, and so
on? No such unlimited police licence was, is, or could be part of Canadian law. Such an
arrangement would place Canada under a “system of government based on the exercise by
persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint”. The binding
part of the reasoning in the Knowlton case - its ratio decidendi - was a good deal narrower.
The public’s freedom of movement had been restricted only in marginal fashion, for a
limited time, over a small area of public street, and in circumstances where there was
clearly good reason to fear an assault on a controversial visiting statesman.17 Though Chief
Justice Fauteux he did not elaborate, the passage just cited emphasizes the specific duty to
Kosygin, the limited “strategic point” of the public street that was barricaded, and the
necessity of the action taken.
Tremblay c. Québec
Nearly thirty years later, the relationship between the ancient duties of constables
and the equally ancient liberties of free speech, free assembly, and free movement came to
be judicially considered in the rather different circumstances of the policing operation
observed by Sinclair and Noreen Stevens during the Quebec City Summit of the America’s
conference. The background to Tremblay c. Québec (Procureur général) [2001] J.Q. was
summarized by Mr. Justice Gilles Blanchet as follows:

17

“On Sunday, October 24, 1971, Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R., was to visit the City of
Edmonton as part of his official visit to Canada and, on the occasion, was to make a short stop at the
Chateau Lacombe Hotel. Police Sergeant Grandish … had been assigned to security duties in the
area surrounding the entrance to the hotel. For this purpose and with the assistance of 25 Police
Officers, he cordoned off, as instructed by his superiors, an area in front of the entrance of the hotel,
which included part of the sidewalk on the south side of Macdonald Drive. At one point, prior to the
impending arrival of Premier Kosygin, Sergeant Grandish was called by two constables posted on
the south side of the sidewalk. There he met the appellant who had indicated to the two constables
that he wanted to take pictures and stated that, to that end, he wished to go down Bellamy Hill,
proceeding along that part of the sidewalk which was in the cordoned off area.”
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The authorities have set up a substantial security barrier around the third Summit of
the Americas, which Quebec City will host for three days beginning on Friday April
20th, to protect the 34 participating heads of state, their delegates and the general
public. Among other measures, in the Upper Town there will be a fenced security
perimeter which may only be entered by certified persons (dignitaries, journalists,
Summit employees and police officers) as well as residents, workers, businessmen
and civil servants holding a pass issued by the RCMP.18
M. Tremblay, a Montreal lawyer, took the view that, as a law-abiding citizen he had a right
to move freely within Canada and, specifically, to make a personal, peaceful, protest in
front of the Quebec Congress Centre. When the police failed to grant him a “pass”
permitting entry to the walled zone, Tremblay “took an action for a permanent injunction in
which he alleged that the security perimeter for the Summit will interfere with his rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Through a
motion for an interlocutory injunction, he asked, firstly, that the security barrier be removed
or, subsidiarily, that a pass be issued giving him access to the site throughout the event.” 19
The case raised a number of complex issues relating to the law of injunctions, police
powers, statutory interpretation, the common law powers of police, fundamental freedoms,
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These matters were considered in
proceedings for an interlocutory injunction heard just days before one of the largest public
protests and largest intergovernmental summits ever to occur in Canada. Although Mr.
Justice Blanchet did not cite Knowlton in his reasons for decision, the case turned on an
analysis of general police powers.
Mr. Justice Blanchet framed the question of the legal authority for police to engage
in such a large urban zoning and pass-issuing enterprise through a Charter analysis. As it
was clear that the intended police action at the Summit of the Americas would inhibit
conventional freedoms including those of peaceful protest and freedom of expression,20 his
Lordship thought that that the arrangements could only be upheld under section 1 of the

18

Tremblay c. Québec (Procureur général) [2001] J.Q. para. 1. (See Appendix for an English
translation provided by Diane G. Cameron, Attorney 4700 Bonavista Ave., Suite 206 Montreal,
Quebec H3W 2C5)
19
Tremblay, para. 2
20
Tremblay, para. 63
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Charter.21 As in Knowlton, there was no statute expressly authorizing the actions taken by
police. The threshold question, approached here through a Charter analysis, was identical
to the central issue in the Knowlton case: did general police duties provide legal authority
for the actions taken by police. If not, the police would have been guilty of an enormous
array of criminal offences, quite apart from their effects on the Charter rights of Canadians.
Mr. Justice Blanchet’s approach was as follows:
69.

As a general rule in such matters, Canadian case law is to the effect

that a limit on the rights and freedoms may be authorized by a "rule of law",
within the meaning of section 1, not only in the case where it is expressly
provided for by statute or regulation, but also when it results by necessary
implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating
requirements or results from the application of a common law rule [R. v.
Twain (sic), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933; R. v. Thompsen (sic), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640;
Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158.]. In the case of both a police
initiative and a specific statute or regulation, the legitimacy of the
infringement of a fundamental right is related to the goal sought:
"The interference with liberty must be necessary for the
carrying out of the particular police duty and it must be
reasonable, having regard to the nature of the liberty
interfered with and the importance of the public purpose
served by the interference." [Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 158, at p. 181].
70

In this case, the Court cannot disregard the duties imposed on the

RCMP under section 18 of the Act establishing it [Royal Canadian Mounted
Police Act, R.S. chap. R-9 (R-10)], read in conjunction with sections 2 b)
and 6 of the Security Offences Act [R.S., chap. S-7 (1984, ch. 21, s. 56)] and
with section 2 of the Criminal Code [R.S. chap. 34], which defines which
persons enjoy international protection.

21

Section 1 reads: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
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71

Moreover, from a practical point of view, the approach suggested by

the Intervenants would amount to systematically prohibiting the application
of the justification test in section 1 of the Charter to any police initiative of a
preventive nature. This would be tantamount to admitting that, even in
circumstances justifying it in the opinion of everyone, no emergency
protection measure taken by the police would be constitutionally acceptable
if it included an even minor limit on the fundamental freedoms of a single
person.
These brief passages traverse difficult terrain. The general legal principle upon
which his Lordship relies is quoted from the Cloutier v. Langlois22 (a case dealing with the
rather different circumstances of the legality of a police “frisk search” incidental to arrest).
In that case Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, for the Court, explained the relevant
principles:
In determining the exact scope of a police power derived from the common
law, this Court often had recourse to considerations of principle, and the
weighing of the competing interests involved (Eccles v. Bourque, [1975] 2
S.C.R. 739, Dedman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2, and R. v. Landry,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 145). Competing interests are important factors in
determining the limits of a common law power. When the power in question
comes into conflict with individual freedoms, it is first necessary to decide
whether the power falls within the general scope of the duty of peace
officers. This duty, clearly identified, must historically have been recognized
by the courts as tending to promote the effective application of the
law. Secondly, the Court must determine whether an invasion of individual
rights is justified. In this regard, Le Dain J. in Dedman defined what he
meant by "justifiable use of the power" in question (at p. 35):
The interference with liberty must be necessary for the carrying out
of the particular police duty and it must be reasonable, having regard
to the nature of the liberty interfered with and the importance of the
public purpose served by the interference.
22

Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 [1990] S.C.J. No. 10
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It is therefore necessary in this second stage to determine whether an
invasion of individual rights is necessary in order for the peace officers to
perform their duty, and whether such an invasion is reasonable in light of the
public purposes served by effective control of criminal acts on the one hand
and on the other respect for the liberty and fundamental dignity of
individuals.23
Thus, a two-stage approach to police powers emerges. First, does statute or common law
impose a particular duty on peace officers? The standards required at this stage are
demanding. The duty must be “clearly identified” and established as having been
historically recognized by the courts. Only after this threshold is passed does the second
stage of inquiry become relevant: what invasions of individual rights are necessary in order
for that duty to be fulfilled? This too is a demanding test: the interference with rights must
be both necessary and calibrated reasonably in relation to the nature of the liberty interfered
with as against the competing public interest that is at stake. Only invasions of individual
rights that are strictly speaking necessary in order for well established police duties to be
fulfilled can be taken as reasonably implied by the initial grant of power, authority, or duty
whether the source of that power is traced to statute or common law origins.
The ruling in Tremblay, skated rather more quickly than one might have hoped over
difficult questions relating to the general scope of police duties and necessarily ancillary
police powers. In addressing these issues the ruling made reference to three statutes: the
RCMP Act, the Security Offences Act, and the Criminal Code. The relevant portions of
each is expressed in broad, general terms of the sort that would not normally be construed
as authorizing significant violations of ordinary freedoms and liberties. As regards the
RCMP Act, Mr. Justice Blanchet referred only to section 18, the relevant portions of which
are as follows:
18. It is the duty of members who are peace officers, subject to the orders of the
Commissioner,
(a) to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the
preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime and of offences against the
laws of Canada and the laws in force in any province in which they may be
23

Cloutier, per L’Heureux-Dubé, para. 50
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employed, and the apprehension of criminals and offenders and others who may
be lawfully taken into custody; …
(d) to perform such other duties and functions as are prescribed by the Governor
in Council or the Commissioner. 24
Although this section defines the powers, duties, and privilege of police in language which
has deep roots in the history of common law policing (“all duties that are assigned to peace
officers in relation to the preservation of the peace”), it was not subjected to any thorough
analysis in the Tremblay ruling.25 The oversight is unfortunate: it is these terms of art that
distinguish and define the character of police duties. Their status as “peace officers”
confers upon them a constitutional role which can only be understood properly if
interpreted against the backdrop of case law developed over centuries. Police occupy a
public office properly understood to be “independent” of political control (in the proper
constitutional law and administrative law sense), and with public responsibilities that take
priority over even the explicit directions of their superiors.26
For its part, the Security Offences Act ( R.S. 1985, c. S-7 ) merely establishes
boundaries between federal and provincial jurisdiction. It accords primacy to the Federal
Government in certain matters by assigning responsibility to the Federal Attorney General
to “conduct proceedings” and “exercise all the powers and perform all the duties and
functions assigned by or under the Criminal Code to the Attorney General” with respect to
both security offences (as defined in the CSIS Act) and offences against “internationally

24

the other clauses deal with service of warrants and escort of prisoners.
See too, section 9 RCMP Act, which also emphasizes that “the powers, authority, protection and
privilege” of RCMP constables are those of a “peace officer”: “Every officer and every person
designated as a peace officer under subsection 7(1) is a peace officer in every part of Canada and
has all the powers, authority, protection and privileges that a peace officer has by law until the
officer or person is dismissed or discharged from the Force as provided in this Act, the regulations
or the Commissioner's standing orders or until the appointment of the officer or person expires or is
revoked.”
26
In Vancouver (City) Police Department v. British Columbia (Police Complaint Commissioner)
[2001] B.C.J. No. 1405; 2001 BCCA 446 (BCCA) (“the Doern Case”), para. 20, Madam Justice
Southin emphasized, obiter, that peace officers, unlike soldiers in Her Majesty’s forces, are
generally not entitled to rely upon defences of superior command for unlawful conduct: “I do not
myself consider that authorities on the responsibility of senior officers of Her Majesty's forces for
the conduct of the troops under their command are apposite in issues relating to peace officers. A
peace officer's individual duty is to see that the Queen's peace is maintained and that those who
breach it, whether they be other peace officers or civilians, are brought to account.”
25
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protected persons” (IPPs). 27 On the policing side, RCMP officers are assigned “primary
responsibility to perform the duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to any
offence referred to in section 2” and the Solicitor General of Canada is empowered to enter
into agreements with provincial governments to facilitate co-operation between the RCMP
and provincial police forces in relation to these matters.28 There is nothing here that
grounds a new sort of police power. Indeed, the duties of RCMP officers are expressly said
to be those of “peace officers”.
Some confusion arising from a misunderstanding of the phrase “internationally
protected persons” is reflected in the Tremblay decision. The term is incorporated in
Canadian law in furtherance of obligations under long-standing principles of international
law including the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons.29 The category includes heads of state, heads of
government, ministers of foreign affairs, and the representatives or officials of either a state
or of certain types of international organizations, as well as their families.30 The public
27

s. 2 SecurityOffences Act:
2. Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, the Attorney General of Canada may
conduct proceedings in respect of an offence under any law of Canada where
(a) the alleged offence arises out of conduct constituting a threat to the security of Canada
within the meaning of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, or
(b) the victim of the alleged offence is an internationally protected person within the
meaning of section 2 of the Criminal Code,
and for that purpose the Attorney General of Canada may exercise all the powers and
perform all the duties and functions assigned by or under the Criminal Code to the Attorney
General.
28
Security Offences Act:
6. (1) Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who are peace officers have the
primary responsibility to perform the duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to
any offence referred to in section 2 or the apprehension of the commission of such an
offence.
(2) To facilitate consultation and cooperation in relation to the carrying out of the duties
assigned to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police under subsection (1), the Solicitor General
may, with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter into arrangements with the
government of a province concerning the responsibilities of members of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police and members of provincial and municipal police forces with
respect to the performance of duties assigned to peace officers in relation to any offence
referred to in section 2 or the apprehension of the commission of such an offence.
29
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_convention_protected_persons.html
30
s. 2 Criminal Code:
internationally protected person" means
(a) a head of state, including any member of a collegial body that performs the functions of a
head of state under the constitution of the state concerned, a head of a government or a
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policy motivation is clear: international diplomacy would suffer tremendously if diplomats
and state officials were subject to harassment connived in or perpetrated by other states.
The statutory recognition of Canada’s obligations to internationally protected persons does
not, however, create new sorts of offences.31 The source of confusion arises, no doubt,
because the obligation is said to involve protecting the “person, freedom or dignity” of
IPPs. “Dignity”, it turns out, is the rub. Peace officers and government officials have
sometimes incorrectly taken this to mean that visiting dignitaries should be shielded from
any exposure to the very sorts of discomfiting free expression that democratic countries
cherish, celebrate – and grant constitutional protection to.32
Although Mr. Justice Blanchet thought that the security barrier and consequential
measures had “the effect of limiting to a great extent two of the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, namely freedom
of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly”,33 he upheld the arrangements under a
section 1 analysis. Although the ruling is somewhat cryptic in this regard, it seems that the

minister of foreign affairs, whenever that person is in a state other than the state in which he
holds that position or office,
(b) a member of the family of a person described in paragraph (a) who accompanies that
person in a state other than the state in which that person holds that position or office,
(c) a representative or an official of a state or an official or agent of an international
organization of an intergovernmental character who, at the time when and at the place where
an offence referred to in subsection 7(3) is committed against his person or any property
referred to in section 431 that is used by him, is entitled, pursuant to international law, to
special protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity, or
(d) a member of the family of a representative, official or agent described in paragraph (c)
who forms part of his household, if the representative, official or agent, at the time when and
at the place where any offence referred to in subsection 7(3) is committed against the
member of his family or any property referred to in section 431 that is used by that member,
is entitled, pursuant to international law, to special protection from any attack on his person,
freedom or dignity;
31
Section 424 of the Criminal Code, for example, specifies punishments for individuals who
threaten offences against international persons that would violate other sections of the Criminal
Code. The listed sections are: 235 (murder), 236 (manslaughter), 266 (assault), 268 (aggravated
assault), 269 (assault causing bodily harm), 269.1 (torture), 271 (sexual assault), 272 (sexual
assault with a weapon, threats to a third party, or causing bodily harm) 273 (aggravated sexual
assault), 279 (kidnapping), 279.1 (hostage taking), 431 (attack on premises, residence, or transport
of internationally protected persons)
32
eg., Obiora Okafor, “The 1997 APEC Summit and the Security of Internationally Protected
Persons: Did Someone Say `Suharto’?” in Pue, ed, Pepper, 185-196.
33
Tremblay, para. 102
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first stage of that analysis – identifying limits “prescribed by law” – was found to be
satisfied in one or both of:
1) the historic duties of peace officers respecting the preservation of the peace, the
prevention of crime and of offences against the law or the apprehension of
Criminals (RCMP Act);
2) the international obligation to protect the “person, freedom, or dignity” of
internationally protected persons.
As has been seen however the second adds little to the first. Thus, it turns out that the
zoning of a large area of Quebec City as a “no-go” area by police was upheld on essentially
the same grounds as those relied upon by the Supreme Court of Canada in Knowlton:
actions taken as necessarily incidental to the quite ordinary police obligations to preserve
the peace, prevent crime, etc.
It is doubtful that, in so extending the Knowlton principle, Tremblay represents good
law. Certainly, the context in which it arose – an application for interlocutory relief which
would have had the effect of dismantling existing security plans only days before a major
international meeting certain to be met with enormous public protests – was not the ideal
forum for a full review of the many complex matters raised. Leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada on a number of questions including “Whether the learned
motions judge erred in deciding that actions of police officers, invoking the residual
common law duty to keep the peace, can constitute a limit `prescribed by law’" was refused
but little can be read into this regarding the Court’s view on the substantive matters at issue.
As things played out, the particular matters were rendered moot before the Court had even
considered the leave application. Moreover, the original applicant for an injunction
(Tremblay) did not participate in the appeal, creating an odd situation wherein any appeal
would have been carried forward by intervenors only.34 The appeal, if it had been heard,
would have been akin to a private reference on a pure question of law.
Canadian law is thus left uncertain in at least 4 respects:
34

Tremblay v. Quebec (Attorney General) [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 231 Supreme Court of Canada File
No.: 28579 On Appeal From The Superior Court Of Quebec Filed: April 20, 2001. S.C.C.
Bulletin, 2001, p. 876. Submitted To The Court: June 11, 2001. S.C.C. Bulletin, 2001, P. 1090.
Dismissed With Costs: July 12, 2001 (without reasons). S.C.C. Bulletin, 2001, p. 1286.
Before: L'Heureux-Dubé, Arbour and LeBel JJ.
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1)

to what extent is the creation of police exclusion zones permitted
as an incident of the general police duty to keep the peace, prevent
crime, and apprehend criminals?

2)

What other sources of authority exist to permit police or
government authorities to create exclusion zones or to clear streets
or other public areas of protesters?

3)

What limits, if any, do constitutionally protected rights such as
those contained in the Charter, flowing from constitutional
recognition of first nations rights, and so on, impose on the
exercise of these powers in particular circumstances?

4)

What is the effect, if any, of Canada’s international obligations?

The Peace Officer’s Duty to Preserve the Peace & Prevent Crime
It seems likely that Mr. Justice Blanchet erred in finding large police exclusion
zones of the sort created in Quebec City to be authorized under the general duties of
common law peace officers. Certainly, no previous case goes anywhere near so far.
First, Tremblay marks an enormous extension in scale from the virtually de minimus
restrictions at issue in Knowlton. Whereas Knowlton involved exclusion primarily from
private property and from a very small portion of an adjacent public street for a short period
of time, the security zone in Tremblay was massive, circumscribed by a fence several
kilometers long, encompassing an important urban centre, surrounding homes and
businesses, blockading many public streets, and policed aggressively for a period of several
days. The latter encompassed a much larger physical space, involved much longer
duration, and affected much larger numbers of people. Moreover, in Tremblay, unlike
Knowlton, police and several governments, operating without explicit statutory
authorization, had created an elaborate bureaucracy that operated complex – though
unpublicized - protocols through which authorities screened workers, inhabitants, and
others for eligibility for police “passes” of one sort or another. In all, this makes for an
astonishing extrapolation from the comparatively modest police power said to be incidental
to common law police duties in Knowlton.
Moreover, the nature or character of the rights affected is significantly different in
the Tremblay situation. The measures taken in Knowlton had little impact on public rights
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of expression or assembly, and minimal impact on the freedom of movement along public
ways. Mr. Knowlton could move from one part of the city to another and could have stood
across the street with friends holding signs or shouting slogans had he wished to do so.
Moreover, Tremblay – style zoning impacts on private property rights, a category of right
that was entirely unhindered in the Knowlton situation. Enclosing homes or businesses
behind police barricades amounts to a partial “taking” or expropriation of the property’s use
for the period of time the barricades are up.
Third, Canadian constitutional history and practice point in other directions. The
creation of large “no-go zones” by officials acting of their own initiative in the absence of
explicit, precise, clear, and definite statutory authority tilts a long way towards an “arbitrary
system of government”. Moreover, common law constitutionalism has long recognized the
importance of free access to public spaces. Madam Justice McLachlin, concurring, in
Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, cited approvingly from an earlier
USA case, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.35
It would be odd, to say the least, if an “immemorial trust” were subject to being overridden
in the absence of precise statutory authorization on the assumption that it has always been
an incidental consequence of the ancient duties of peace officers to preserve the peace and
prevent crime. As was noted by Chief Justice Dickson in another case,
…. To find that arbitrary police action is justified simply because it is directed at the
fulfilment of police duties would be to sanction a dangerous exception to the
supremacy of law. It is the function of the legislature, not the courts, to authorize
arbitrary police action that would otherwise be unlawful as a violation of rights
traditionally protected at common law. 36

35

Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), at pp. 515-16, as cited in
Commonwealth of Canada, per Lamer, C.J., para. 14, McLachlin J., para. 225 and L’HeureuxDubé, J. para 138.
36
R. v. Dedman, [1985] 2. S.C.R., 2; [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, per Dickson C.J., dissenting, para. 25.
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Fourth, although the concept of ancillary police powers has been applied with some
frequency in Canadian law, the circumstances of its application have always been limited
and precise. Most typically, the doctrine has been invoked with regard to questions such as
the circumstances in which police may search persons, effects, vehicles, or premises,37
detain a person for short periods in order to facilitate an investigation,38 and so on. The
question that arises, then, is whether the ancillary powers doctrine as it has been developed
in Canada to date is properly understood as extending by analogy to authorizing Tremblaystyle police measures. It is to this line of authorities that I now turn.
The “Ancillary Police Powers” Doctrine
R. v. Dedman
The leading authority, R. v. Dedman, arose when an Ontario driver challenged
random police stops carried out as part of an anti-impaired driving programme (designated
as “Reduce Impaired Driving Everywhere, or “R.I.D.E.”). Its operations were described by
Chief Justice Dickson as follows:
The aim of the R.I.D.E. program in Ontario is to reduce impaired driving
by detecting the impaired motorist and deterring others from driving after
drinking. The police go to a location where they believe there has been a
high incidence of impaired driving or alcohol related accidents. Motorists
passing through this location are requested, on a random basis, to pull over
and stop. Police officers ask the driver for a valid driver's licence and proof
of insurance and they note the condition of the vehicle and the driver. The
demand for a licence and proof of insurance is made for the purpose of
initiating conversation with the ultimate goal of allowing the police to detect
the drinking driver whom they might otherwise be unable to detect. R.I.D.E.
officers are equipped with approved road-side screening devices to permit
them to make demands for breath samples, pursuant to s. 234.1 of the
37

for example, R. v. Griffith, [2003] A.J. No. 312, 2003 ABPC 46 (Fradsham, Prov. Ct. J); R. v.
Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Feeney (1997), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 129; R. v.
Golub (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [1997]
S.C.C.A. No. 571; R. v. Sharpe [2002] B.C.J. No. 1219; 2002 BCSC 213 (Shaw J.); R. v. Davis,
[2004] A.J. No. 64; 2004 ABCA 33 (Alberta Court of Appeal); R. v. Godoy (1998), 131 C.C.C. (3d)
129 (S.C.C.), [affirming] (1997), 115 C.C.C. (3d.) 272 (Ont. C.A.)
38
for example, R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52, rev'g (2002) 169 C.C.C. (3d) 272,
2002 MBCA 121; R. v. Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 2004 BCCA 484
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Criminal Code, if they form the requisite grounds during their conversation
with the driver.39
Though the case is properly understood as dealing with ancillary police powers
extrapolated from the common law duties of peace officers, the existence of abundant
statutory authority conferring powers very like the police used as part of the R.I.D.E.
programme was pivotal to the decision. The central issue was whether police had the
power to briefly detain randomly selected motorists as part of this road safety initiative.
Police had clear, explicit, statutory authority to stop vehicles, to inspect licences, and, in
proper circumstances, to demand that motorists submit to breathalyzer tests. 40 Ontario’s
Highway Traffic Act provided that “[e]very operator of a motor vehicle” was required to
surrender his or her drivers licence “for reasonable inspection upon the demand of a
constable”. The same Act conferred express power on police officers “in the lawful
execution” of their “duties and responsibilities” to “require the driver of a motor vehicle to
stop…”41 The difficulty in Dedman arose because police admitted that the stop-check
scheme rested on a ruse: the initial stops were random and the demand to see the licence a
ploy designed to generate reasonable grounds to demand alcohol testing. In exercising a
power given for one purpose, the police put it to an unauthorized use. Insofar as their
statutory powers were concerned they acted, in effect, with colorable intent. Mr. Justice Le
Dain for the majority explained that:
… even assuming … that a power to stop a motor vehicle in order to
demand surrender of a licence for inspection arises by implication from the
terms of s. 14 of The Highway Traffic Act, … it is a power that must be
exercised for the purpose indicated in s. 14. It cannot be validly exercised
for another purpose, using the purpose indicated in s. 14 as a subterfuge or
pretext. In this case, it is clear … that while the police officer asked the
appellant for his licence, the true purpose of the signal to stop was not to

39

R. v. Dedman, [1985] 2. S.C.R., 2; [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, para. 2., per Dickson C.J., dissenting
The Criminal Code explicitly authorized them to demand breath samples where the “officer
reasonably suspects that a person who … has care or control of a motor vehicle… has alcohol in
his body….” (excerpts from s. 234(1) of the Criminal Code, as cited by Le Dain J., in Dedman,
para. 49.)
41
excerpts from s. The Ontario Highway Traffic Act as cited by Le Dain J., (for majority) in
Dedman, para. 60, 63.
40
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demand surrender of the licence for inspection but rather to determine
whether there were grounds for a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had
alcohol in his blood…. I am, therefore, of the opinion that s. 14 of The
Highway Traffic Act did not provide statutory authority for the signal to stop
in the present case.42
The Supreme Court was unanimous on this point.43 The majority considered the issue akin
to one of vires because police “only act lawfully if they act in the exercise of authority
which is conferred by statute or derived as a matter of common law from their duties.”44
Chief Justice Dickson, for the minority, stressed that it is “a fundamental tenet of the rule of
law in this country that the police, in carrying out their general duties as law enforcement
officers of the state, have limited powers and are only entitled to interfere with the liberty
or property of the citizen to the extent authorized by law… Absent explicit or implied
statutory authority, the police must be able to find authority for their actions at common
law. Otherwise they act unlawfully.”45 Though divided as to the outcome, the full bench
agreed on the central importance of the principle of the rule of law: police authority is
circumscribed, and no police action is lawful unless it is manifestly authorized by statute or
at common law.
If the R.I.D.E. programme was not authorized explicitly or by necessary implication
under either statute or common law, it would amount to an unlawful exercise of power. All
seven Supreme Court of Canada justices agreed that, in the particular circumstances, the
scheme of stop-checks were unauthorized under any applicable legislation. The minority
also considered it to be beyond the scope of common law police powers (as given statutory
expression in Ontario’s Police Act46). The majority opted for a middle-ground of sorts.
Mr. Justice Le Dain adopted the view that the stop-check programme’s interference with
42

Dedman, per Le Dain J., para. 62.
Dickson, C.J., dissenting, agreed with the majority on this issue: para. 10.
44
Dedman, per Le Dain J., para. 58.
45
Dedman, per Dickson C.J., dissenting, para. 12.
46
Section 55 of the Police Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 351: “The members of police forces appointed under
Part II, except assistants and civilian employees, are charged with the duty of preserving the peace,
preventing robberies and other crimes and offences, including offences against the by-laws of the
municipality, and apprehending offenders, and laying informations before the proper tribunal, and
prosecuting and aiding in the prosecuting of offenders, and have generally all the powers and
privileges and are liable to all the duties and responsibilities that belong to constables.” as quoted
Dedman, per Le Dain J., para. 64
43
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the qualified right of licensed drivers to “circulate in a motor vehicle on the public
highway”47 was permitted as a necessary extension of common law police powers in the
particular context of traffic control.48 In contrast to the “ordinary right of movement of the
individual” (a “fundamental liberty”) the “right” to drive about freely on public roads was
of a different character. It was “a licensed activity that is subject to regulation and control
for the protection of life and property.”49 In that particular context, the majority accepted
that certain powers are “inherent in the execution of a police officer’s duty” or “ancillary
powers” which “enable the police to perform such reasonable acts as are necessary for the
due execution of their duties.”50
In reaching their conclusion the majority sought to apply the test of police powers
set out by Mr. Justice Ashworth in R. v. Waterfield:
In the judgment of this court it would be difficult … to reduce within
specific limits the general terms in which the duties of police constables
have been expressed. In most cases it is probably more convenient to
consider what the police constable was actually doing and in particular
whether such conduct was prima facie an unlawful interference with a
person's liberty or property. If so, it is then relevant to consider whether (a)
such conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute
or recognised at common law and (b) whether such conduct, albeit within
the general scope of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of powers
associated with the duty. Thus, while it is no doubt right to say in general
terms that police constables have a duty to prevent crime and a duty, when
crime is committed, to bring the offender to justice, it is also clear from the
decided cases that when the execution of these general duties involves
interference with the person or property of a private person, the powers of
constables are not unlimited. To cite only one example, in Davis v. Lisle,
47

Dedman, per Le Dain J., para 68.
“It has been held that at common law the principal duties of police officers are the preservation of
the peace, the prevention of crime, and the protection of life and property, from which is derived the
duty to control traffic on the public roads.” Dedman, per Le Dain J., para 68.
49
Dedman, per Le Dain J., para 68.
50
Dickson J., (dissenting) in The Wiretap Reference, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 697, and Leigh, Police
Powers in England and Wales (1975), p. 33, as cited in Dedman, [1985] 2. S.C.R., 2; [1985] S.C.J.
No. 45, per Le Dain J., para 67.
48
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[1936] 2 All E.R. 213; [1936] 2 K.B. 434, it was held that even if a police
officer had a right to enter a garage to make inquiries, he became a
trespasser after the appellant had told him to leave the premises, and that he
was not, therefore, acting thenceforward in the execution of his duty, with
the result that the appellant could not be convicted of assaulting or
obstructing him in the execution of his duty.51

In Canada, the “Waterfield test” is applied in two stages:
1)

“whether the random stop fell within the general scope of the
duties of a police officer under statute or common law” 52

2)

“whether a particular interference with liberty is an unjustifiable
use of a power associated with a police duty” 53

Or, more crudely :
•

do the police have a power? and

•

should they have used it?

As far as the first stage of the test goes, the majority had no doubt, on the particular facts of
the case – including the statutory background, the highly regulated nature of driving, and
previous case law establishing the right of police officers to control traffic, - that random
stops such as that involved in the R.I.D.E. programme “fell within the general scope of the
duties of a police officer to prevent crime and to protect life and property by the control of
traffic. These are the very objects of the R.I.D.E. program….”54 It is worth pausing here to
note that it would be a serious misreading of these passages to interpret them as suggesting
that anything police officers do within reason and with the intent of preventing crime,
protecting life, or protecting property would pass the first stage of the Waterfield test.55

51

R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, at 661-662, as cited in Dedman, [1985] 2. S.C.R., 2;
[1985] S.C.J. No. 45, per Le Dain J., para 66. The Waterfield test had previously been accepted as
authoritative in the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Stenning, [1970] S.C.R. 631; Knowlton v. The
Queen, [1974] S.C.R. 443.
52
Dedman, per Le Dain J., para 68.
53
Ibid., para 69.
54
Ibid., para 68 (emphasis added).
55
This was the position of the Government of Canada in promoting Bill C-35 (An Act to amend the
Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act) in February 2002: “Government Response
To The Twelfth Report Of The Standing Committee On Foreign Affairs And International Trade

Pue, Trespass & Rights, paper prepared for the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2005-02-04
28 of 96

This clearly is not what the Supreme Court of Canada intended: their comments are
grounded in the very particular context of traffic regulation in which a complexly
overlapping web of common law and statutorily-imposed duties and powers defines citizenpolice relations. The part one hurdle was cleared after a careful, legally precise, analysis of
both the common law and statutory duties of police. As Doherty J.A. explained in a
subsequent case,
The law imposes broad general duties on the police but it provides them with only
limited powers to perform those duties. Police duties and their authority to act in the
performance of those duties are not co-extensive. Police conduct is not rendered
lawful merely because it assisted in the performance of the duties assigned to the
police. Where police conduct interferes with the liberty or freedom of the
individual, that conduct will be lawful only if it is authorized by law. That law may
be a specific statutory power or it may be the common law.56
But, always, there must be clear legal authorization for police power.
The second part of the Waterfield test does however take us near to a general
“reasonableness” standard: was it “reasonably necessary”, in all the circumstances of the
particular situation, for the police to deploy these powers in such a way as to interfere with
the liberty of an individual?57 It bears emphasis, if only because the point was very nearly
overlooked in Tremblay, that this is the second part of a two-stage test: we do not get to an
inquiry into the “reasonableness” of police action unless the particular action has already
been found to fall within the general duties of police officers. “Reasonableness” does not
provide a method by which to avoid the need for a careful legal and historical analysis of
police powers. When we do approach the “reasonableness” of an interference with liberty
the standard is rigorous. It is evaluated with reference to necessity vis-à-vis the police duty
and a balancing scales in which the cost to individual liberty is weighed against other
public purposes. This second stage of inquiry was described by Mr. Justice Le Dain as
coming in three parts:

(Security at Intergovernmental Conferences)” http://www.psepcsppcc.gc.ca/Publications/Policing/C35_e.asp
56
R. v. Simpson (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 493-4, per Doherty J.A.
57
Dedman, per Le Dain J., para 69, quoting the test as set out in Johnson v. Phillips, [1975] 3 All
E.R. 682.
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1)

“The interference with liberty must be necessary for the carrying out of
the particular police duty

2)

and it must be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the liberty
interfered with

3)

and the importance of the public purpose served by the interference.” 58

On the particular facts before the court Mr. Justice Le Dain found that “the seriousness of
the problem of impaired driving” was sufficient to show the necessity of the R.I.D.E.
program (stage 1) and to demonstrate the importance of the public purpose served by it
(stage 3). Weighing heavily on the other side, stop-checks clearly interfered with liberty,
causing both inconvenience and psychological distress to innocent drivers. These concerns
were not sufficient to render the police actions unlawful in this particular case however
because of the character of driving as “a licensed activity subject to regulation and control
in the interest of safety”, the limited psychological distress that innocent drivers would in
fact be subjected to, the “relatively short duration” of the police stops, and the “slight
inconvenience” involved. 59
The Supreme Court of Canada has reviewed the general principles applicable to the
interpretation of statutes or common law doctrine relating to ancillary police powers in
other significant decisions dealing with wiretaps, police entry to residences, and searches of
individuals placed under arrest. As in Dedman, the approach of the Court in each situation
was cautious, stopping far short of creating a sort of plenary police power to do anything
that might reasonably be expected to protect property or life or prevent crime. In all cases
the first stage of the Waterfield – style enquiry is pursued carefully against the doctrinal
history of common law policing and with painstaking attention to the canons of statutory
interpretation.
Wiretap Reference & Lyons v. The Queen
In Reference re: Judicature Act (Alberta), s.27(1) (the “Wiretap Reference”),60 the
court dealt with two questions referred by the Alberta Government:
The Alberta Government … referred two questions to the Alberta Court of
Appeal raising the issues of (1) whether, in Part IV.1 of the Criminal Code,
58

Ibid., per Le Dain, J., para 69 (emphasis and paragraph breaks added).
Ibid.
60
Reference re: Judicature Act (Alberta), s. 27(1) [1984] 2 S.C.R. 697 (Wiretap Reference)
59
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Parliament intended by necessary implication to empower police officers to
enter private property to install listening devices when they act under an
authorization to intercept private communications and (2) whether a judge
may expressly authorize such entry when he grants an authorization for an
interception of private communications.61
Although, the Court of Appeal answered both in the negative Mr. Justice Estey’s majority
opinion answered both questions in the affirmative, relying on his own reasoning in Lyons
v. The Queen. 62 In the Wiretap Reference and Lyons the problem of statutory
interpretation arose because Criminal Code provisions creating a scheme for judicial
authorization of wiretaps and other bugging equipment did not “expressly authorize entry
by the officers into the premises” so as to allow the installation of the equipment. After
reviewing available technology, Mr. Justice Estey concluded that “all forms of
eavesdropping (other than passive acoustic eavesdropping by means of parabolic and other
like microphones) entail either the personal entry into the premises by the interceptor or his
collaborators for the purpose of installing equipment; or the invasion of the premises in
question by directing at those premises energy in the form of electromagnetic waves.” 63
The question, simply, was whether the statutory grant of authority to intercept private
communications by means of specified sorts of equipment necessarily implied the authority
to surreptitiously enter private premises in order to install and maintain that equipment.
The majority of the court took the view that the authority to use specific equipment that
required installation necessarily implied the authority to install it: Parliament would
otherwise have acted in vain. Mr. Justice Estey’s approach to statutory interpretation was
straightforward:
Intrusion into privacy is an obvious and inevitable concomitant of an
authorized crime detection procedure. Explicitness is a requirement before
legislation may properly be found to be intrusive of these basic
rights. However, the need to express the obvious is not present in the canons
of statutory interpretation.64
61

(Wiretap Reference) 697 (headnote)
Lyons v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 633
63
Lyons
64
Lyons
62
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As in Dedman, the court found an ancillary police power of sorts by necessary implication.
As in Dedman, it did so narrowly and in the context of an extensively elaborated statutory
arrangement surrounding the particular interferences with liberty. Even in this context,
powerful dissenting judgments in both Wiretap Reference and Lyons cautioned against too
readily reaching the conclusion that infringements of important liberties are impliedly
authorized.65
R. v. Godoy
In R. v. Godoy 66 police officers responded to a “911” emergency telephone call
which had been disconnected before the caller spoke. Godoy answered the door and
assured the police officers that there was “no problem”. When officers asked if they could
come in to the residence he tried to close the door. The police made a forced entry and
discovered Godoy’s spouse beaten and sobbing in the bedroom. She informed the officers
that Godoy had hit her. He was acquitted at trial on charges of resisting arrest and
assaulting a police officer, on the basis that the original entry had been unlawful, rendering
“all subsequent actions of the police, including the arrest of the appellant … illegal.”67 The
Supreme Court of Canada grappled with the question of whether the forcible entry into the
home, clearly “a prima facie interference with a person's liberty and property”68 was
justifiable under the Waterfield test as elaborated in Dedman. Chief Justice Lamer, for a
unanimous bench, took it that the common law duties of peace officers (as incorporated in
Ontario legislation) included “the ‘preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and
the protection of life and property’.”69 The Court understood the intent of the 911
emergency telephone system as being to provide a means whereby people in distress can
seek immediate assistance. Hence, the police duty to protect life is “engaged whenever it
can be inferred that the 911 caller is or may be in some distress, including cases where the
call is disconnected before the nature of the emergency can be determined.”70 Chief Justice
Lamer thought “it is reasonable, indeed imperative, that the police assume that the caller is

65

The Charter was not considered in either case.
R. v. Godoy [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311; [1998] S.C.J. No. 85
67
Godoy, para. 5.
68
Godoy, para 13.
69
Godoy, para. 15
70
Godoy, para. 16.
66
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in some distress and requires immediate assistance”71 when a 911 call is dropped. Pranks
and mistakes apart, a 911 call signals precisely urgency, distress and a need for immediate
assistance. Given the very real possibilities of intimidation, hostage-taking, domestic
violence, incapacitation (and hence inability to answer the door), and the like, the court
feared that the call for assistance and the police duty to protect life could be rendered
nugatory if a police response could be deflected merely by an unanswered door or the
assurance that there is “no problem” offered by whoever happens to their call.
… the importance of the police duty to protect life warrants and justifies a forced
entry into a dwelling in order to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 caller. The
public interest in maintaining an effective emergency response system is obvious
and significant enough to merit some intrusion on a resident's privacy interest.
However, … that the intrusion must be limited to the protection of life and
safety. The police have authority to investigate the 911 call and, in particular, to
locate the caller and determine his or her reasons for making the call and provide
such assistance as may be required. The police authority for being on private
property in response to a 911 call ends there. They do not have further permission
to search premises or otherwise intrude on a resident's privacy or property. 72
Again, we find that the ancillary police power extrapolated from common law duties is very
narrowly circumscribed. In furtherance of their general duty to protect life, a specific cry
for help produces a specific police duty to ascertain clearly the extent to which help is
needed by the individual who placed the call. The emergency call in effect operates as an
invitation to police to enter premises and the invitation can only be withdrawn by the
individual who issued it – a matter about which the police must have great confidence
before they turn away. The ancillary power is narrow, specific as to time, place, and
persons, and does not give rise to any wider police investigatory powers.
Cloutier v. Langlois
In Cloutier v. Langlois,73 mentioned in passing above, the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld a police frisk search incidental to arrest. The Court adopted a two-fold approach:
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Godoy, para. 16.
Godoy, para 22.
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Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158
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first, was there a police power to search a lawfully arrested person? Secondly, what was
the scope of that power?
As in other cases, a generalized “reasonableness” test does not serve to ground the
asserted police power. Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, for the Court, approached the first
question with great care by means of an exhaustive review of the common law from the
nineteenth century to the present. She concluded that the power to search exists “as a
simple corollary of arrest” under Canadian law and that
the police have a power to search a lawfully arrested person and to seize
anything in his or her possession or immediate surroundings to guarantee the
safety of the police and the accused, prevent the prisoner's escape or provide
evidence against him. The common thread in this line of authority is the
objective of guaranteeing safety and applying the law effectively.74
The more difficult questions in Cloutier did not surround the existence of a common law
police power to search individuals placed under arrest. That much was well established.
Rather, the question was about the scope or limits of that power in particular circumstances.
Here – not in the first stage of the test - the Supreme Court of Canada resorted to a
balancing test of sorts. Even where the general authority of police is well established it is
important to assess the reasonableness of the police action in the particular circumstances
“in light of the public purposes served by effective control of criminal acts on the one hand
and on the other respect for the liberty and fundamental dignity of individuals.”75 The court
emphasized the importance of individual freedoms:
For centuries the common law has spearheaded the protection of individual
freedoms. The concept that a person and his home are inviolable has been gradually
set up in the face of the potential abuse of power by the State. In the early
seventeenth century the common law had already held "[t]hat the house of everyone
is to him as his castle and fortress" (Semayne's Case (1604), 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 E.R.
194). Similarly, an invisible "fortress" was built bit by bit around each subject of
the Empire and gradually any interference with individual freedom was seen as
prima facie unlawful, the representatives of the State having the burden of

74
75

Cloutier, para 49
Cloutier, para 50
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establishing a legal basis for their actions: "no member of the executive can
interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition that
he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice" (Eleko v. Officer
Administering the Government of Nigeria, [1931] A.C. 662 (P.C.), at p. 670). This
fundamental role of guardian of freedom and property continued and expanded with
the advent of the Charter (R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at p. 164, per
Wilson J.): "Thus, the rights guaranteed in the Charter erect around each individual,
metaphorically speaking, an invisible fence over which the state will not be allowed
to trespass. The role of the courts is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters of
the fence".

76

When, on the particular facts, the freedom and dignity of the individual was balanced
against the public interest in the safe and effective enforcement of law, the frisk search in
Cloutier was found to be acceptable. The reasons, Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
explained, were its “relatively non-intrusive” nature of the search, lack of physical force,
short duration, and the unavailability of any less intrusive alternative that would meet the
basic need of ensuring police safety. 77 Searches on arrest are legal if they are conducted in
pursuit of a valid objective and using only of such constraint as is “proportionate to the
objectives sought and the other circumstances of the situation.” Valid objectives of a
search include looking for “an object that “may be a threat to the safety of the police, the
accused or the public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence against the
accused”.78
R. v. Edwards
In R. v. Edwards the Alberta Provincial Court extended the doctrine to allow for a
very limited sort of spatial zoning. That case arose when two brothers returned to their car
from a local bar and found it behind a temporary police barricade.
… the police were investigating a homicide where a body had been located. The
police put a yellow tape across the area where the homicide had taken place and
officers were posted to prevent access to the area. The Edwards vehicle was parked
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in the crime scene area. The officers denied the Edwards brothers access to their
vehicle. The Edwards brothers demanded access to their vehicle. 79
The brothers became loud and verbally aggressive in their dealings with the police, and
were eventually arrested for causing a disturbance. Because “there is no particular statute
granting police the power to prevent individuals from accessing personal property that has
the misfortune of becoming part of a temporary crime scene” the question arose as to
whether police had the right to prevent the brothers from simply going to their vehicle and
driving off. Provincial Court Judge Allen looked to the ancillary powers of police,
beginning with the observation that the common law duties of police extend to keeping the
peace, preventing crime, protecting property, detecting crime and bringing offenders to
justice.80 Judge Allen concluded that the importance of a murder investigation, the
possible forensic relevance of the particular vehicle, the temporary nature of the
inconvenience, and the necessity of securing the crime scene in order to preserve evidence
all led to the conclusion that the actions of the police were necessarily incidental to their
general duty to apprehend offenders and prosecute crime. 81 In the result, this case resulted
in recognition, through the ancillary power doctrine, of a police “zoning” of sorts. It is
however a “zoning” severely limited in space, time, and application.82 Moreover, the need
arises in a situation akin to an emergency which could not have been planned for in
advance and in which no less intrusive options are unavailable.
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R. v. Edwards [2004] A.J. No. 68, 2004 ABPC 14, Allen, Prov. Ct. J., para. 1.
Edwards, para. 36
81
Edwards, para. 48.
82
Pace J.A.’s judgment (for the court) in R. v. Williams (N.S.C.A.) [1986] N.S.J. No. 138 dealt
with the question of the lawfulness of police traffic control measures imposed during a Tall Ship
event in Halifax. Though it might be construed as authorizing a police zoning issue of sorts, the
judgment was limited in its application to the qualified liberty of driving. The police power to give
directions to drivers (including telling them not to drive down a particular street) was held to be
authorized by the Nova Scotia Motor Vehicle Act, which required drivers to obey the instructions of
police officers: “Clearly, the legislation intended in enacting Section 74(1) that directions would be
given by peace officers in the general execution of their duty under the Act, otherwise there would
be no necessity in imposing a general duty to obey.” Alternatively, he thought that “even if the
implied authority was not contained in the Act, I would uphold the conviction on the grounds that it
fell within the general scope of duties of a police officer to protect life and property by the control
of traffic and the direction by the officer was reasonably necessary and justifiable under all of the
circumstances.”
80
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In sum, the leading Canadian authorities on the ancillary police power do not
support the proposition that, absent express statutory authority, police “zoning” of public
space is an acceptable means of crowd control. The following categories of authority
would seem to provide alternative possible groundings for legal power to exclude
individuals or groups from land on which they wish to be present for the purposes of
expression or to force the dispersal of people who have already gathered for these purposes:
1) specific statutory authority given in defined situations such as
that found in the Foreign Missions Act and the Emergencies Act.
2) the “riot act” provisions of the Criminal Code.
3) the authority of land-owners (including municipalities and the
Crown) to prohibit trespass or remove trespassers.
4) court-ordered injunctions.
.
Specific Statutory Provisions
Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act
The Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act 1991, c. 41 was
amended in 2002 to include the following provision:
10.1 (1) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has the primary responsibility to
ensure the security for the proper functioning of any intergovernmental
conference in which two or more states participate, that is attended by
persons granted privileges and immunities under this Act and to which an
order made or continued under this Act applies
(2) For the purpose of carrying out its responsibility under subsection (1), the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police may take appropriate measures, including
controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a
manner that is reasonable in the circumstances. 83
Assuming this broad and imprecise provision is capable of withstanding constitutional
challenge, it might provide legal authority for operations something like challenged in

83

S.C. 2002, c. 12, s. 5
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Tremblay, but only in the specific circumstances of international meetings. Given its
limited applicability, it need only be noted here.
Emergencies Act
The Federal Emergencies Act84 also authorizes similar measures:
19. (1) While a declaration of a public order emergency is in effect, the
Governor in Council may make such orders or regulations with respect to
the following matters as the Governor in Council believes, on reasonable
grounds, are necessary for dealing with the emergency:
(a) the regulation or prohibition of
(i) any public assembly that may reasonably be expected to lead to a
breach of the peace,
(ii) travel to, from or within any specified area, or
(iii) the use of specified property;
(b) the designation and securing of protected places;
…
(e) the imposition
(i) on summary conviction, of a fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both that fine
and imprisonment, or
(ii) on indictment, of a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or
imprisonment not exceeding five years or both that fine and
imprisonment,
for contravention of any order or regulation made under this section.

84

Emergencies Act R.S.C. 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.)
Similarly, it is remotely possible that powers contained in provincial emergencies legislation such
as Ontario’s Emergency Management Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9 Amended by: S.O. 1999, c. 12,
Sched. P, ss. 3-5, 7-9; S.O. 2002, c. 17, Sched. C, s. 10; S.O. 2002, c. 4, ss. 2-5, 7-16; S.O. 2003, c.
1, s. 14) could be brought into play in some public policing contexts. Section 7.1(2), for example,
permits the Executive to “temporarily suspend the operation of a provision of a statute, regulation,
rule, by-law or order of the Government of Ontario” and “set out a replacement provision” during
the period of the emergency. These extraordinary powers could, of course, only be lawfully
deployed in truly extraordinary circumstances

84

Pue, Trespass & Rights, paper prepared for the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2005-02-04
38 of 96

These powers have never been invoked since the Emergencies Act replaced Canada’s
former War Measures Act. For this reason and because they lie exclusively in the federal
domain they are noted here in passing only.85
“Riot Act”
Disorderly crowds are nothing new. Anglo-Canadian law has provided legal means
permitting their dispersal for centuries through measures making it unlawful to cause a
disturbance86 or prohibiting unlawful assembly and riot, amongst others. The Criminal
Code contains the following provisions:
63. (1) An unlawful assembly is an assembly of three or more persons who, with
intent to carry out any common purpose, assemble in such a manner or so conduct
themselves when they are assembled as to cause persons in the neighbourhood of
the assembly to fear, on reasonable grounds, that they
(a) will disturb the peace tumultuously; or
(b) will by that assembly needlessly and without reasonable cause
provoke other persons to disturb the peace tumultuously.
(2) Persons who are lawfully assembled may become an unlawful assembly if
they conduct themselves with a common purpose in a manner that would have made
the assembly unlawful if they had assembled in that manner for that purpose.
….

86

Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 170 provides:
175. (1) Every one who
(a) not being in a dwelling-house, causes a disturbance in or near a public place,
(i) by fighting, screaming, shouting, swearing, singing or using insulting or
obscene language,
(ii) by being drunk, or
(iii) by impeding or molesting other persons,
(b) openly exposes or exhibits an indecent exhibition in a public place,
(c) loiters in a public place and in any way obstructs persons who are in
that place, or
(d) disturbs the peace and quiet of the occupants of a dwelling-house by
discharging firearms or by other disorderly conduct in a public place
is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
The meaning of “disturbance” was discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lohnes,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 167; [1992] S.C.J. No. 6
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64. A riot is an unlawful assembly that has begun to disturb the peace
tumultuously.
65. Every one who takes part in a riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
66. Every one who is a member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offence
punishable on summary conviction.
67. A person who is
(a) a justice, mayor or sheriff, or the lawful deputy of a mayor or sheriff,
…
who receives notice that, at any place within the jurisdiction of the person,
twelve or more persons are unlawfully and riotously assembled together
shall go to that place and, after approaching as near as is safe, if the person is
satisfied that a riot is in progress, shall command silence and thereupon
make or cause to be made in a loud voice a proclamation in the following
words or to the like effect:
Her Majesty the Queen charges and commands all persons being
assembled immediately to disperse and peaceably to depart to their
habitations or to their lawful business on the pain of being guilty of
an offence for which, on conviction, they may be sentenced to
imprisonment for life.
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN.
68. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life
who
…
(b) does not peaceably disperse and depart from a place where the
proclamation referred to in section 67 is made within thirty minutes after it
is made;
These provisions are the origin for the common expression “reading the riot act”. They set
out a miniature code, of sorts, mediating the line between lawful and unlawful assembly87
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Rex v. Patterson, [1931] 3 D.L.R. 267, at 274 per Middleton J.A.: “No matter how worthy the
cause, or how clear the right to be asserted may be, our law requires the worthy cause to be
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(defined by reasonable fear of tumultuous88 disturbance of the peace), a process by which
assembled individuals can lawfully be ordered to leave places they are normally entitled to
be (the reading of a proclamation in specified form by a court official – a sheriff - or by a
magistrate – a justice or the mayor), expanded police powers, and a significant immunity
for police officers. Only occasionally used,89 these provisions provide lawful authority
where it would otherwise be absent, and provide some evidence of what was considered
justifiable in a free society in the decades before the adoption of the Charter. Police are
given extraordinary powers and obligations in relation to suppressing a riot including
authority to “disperse or arrest” individuals who do not comply with the section 67
proclamation,90 licence to use or to order the use of as much force as is necessary and
reasonable “to suppress a riot”,91 and immunity from civil or criminal proceedings arising
“by reason of resistance”. 92 The extraordinary character of the riot act provisions was
described by Harvey, C.J.A., in R, v.. Jones & Sheinin:
If an unlawful assembly goes a step further and proceeds to do what the
persons in the neighbourhood fear it may do, viz., "disturb the peace
tumultuously" it has become a riot (s. 88) and the punishment for a rioter is
2 years but that is not all that is involved in it. In the case of a riot by twelve
or more persons, any sheriff, mayor or justice, who has notice of it is legally
bound to do what is commonly spoken of as "read the riot act" in other
words he has to call on them to disperse (s. 91) and if they fail to disperse
within 30 minutes they are guilty of an offence for which they may be sent
to prison for life, (s. 92), but that is not the worst, for equally if they do not
advocated and the right to be asserted in a peaceable way, and not by riot and tumult. The provision
of the Code prohibiting unlawful assemblies is for the purpose of drawing the line between a lawful
meeting and an assembly, either unlawful in its inception, or which is deemed to have become
unlawful either by reason of the action of those assembled, or by reason of the improper action of
others having no sympathy with the objects of the meeting.
88
28 In R. v. Brien [1993] N.W.T.J. No. 116, Mr. Justice de Weerdt of the Northwest Territories
Supreme Court explained that “The words "tumultuous" and "tumultuously" are derived from the
noun "tumult", which connotes actual or threatened force and violence in addition to any public
disorder, confusion and uproar: R. v. Lockhart (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 512 (C.A.) at p.529. “
89
Amongst a few other cases, the Riot Act was read by the mayor of Penticton during 1991: R. v.
Loewen, (1992) 75 C.C.C. (3d) 184.
90
s.33 Criminal Code
91
s. 32 Criminal Code
92
s. 33 (2) Criminal Code
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disperse the officer mentioned is legally bound to cause their arrest for
which purpose he is entitled to call to his assistance whom he will, and if in
the endeavour to arrest or disperse them any of the rioters are killed such
killing is excused, (s. 93), and moreover if the sheriff or other officer fails in
his duty he is liable to be imprisoned for 2 years, (s. 94), and if any one
called in to assist fails to render such assistance he also is guilty of a crime
and may be punished by one year's imprisonment. (S. 95). 93
In practical terms it seems that, assuming the necessary legal criteria are met, individuals
can be arrested and charged for public order offences including unlawful assembly without
the need to “read the Riot Act”. This would seem to suggest that the use of military-style
force (whether baton charges, tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, water cannon, or
bullets) directed at a crowd as such (rather than at lawbreaking individuals in the crowd) is
not lawful in the absence of express statutory authority. This point is reinforced, albeit
somewhat obliquely, in Madam Justice Southin’s judgment in Doern94 quoting from a
ruling of British Columbia Police Complaint Commissioner Don Morrison:
I am also mindful of an article in Police, Vol. 22 at pp. 40-41, entitled
"Dampen their Ardour":
The question that the court will ask is, 'Was the person struck doing
something at the moment he was struck that necessitated such force
being applied?' Hitting out indiscriminately at anyone in striking
distance probably would not persuade the court that force was
'reasonable'. Yet, hitting out indiscriminately is what a baton charge
amounts to and no amount of verbal gymnastics will alter the fact.
Property Rights & Protest
Common Law of Trespass and Trespass Legislation
It is unusual for the “riot act” or any other special measures to be invoked as means
of controlling protest. Given this and the fact that the “ancillary powers” doctrine seems an
insecure foundation for even the most obviously desirable policing measures, it remains to
consider the rights of property owners – including municipalities and governments – to
93
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limit the access of individuals or groups to the property they manage. The general rule is
that property owners may do as they wish with their land. This includes the right to
exclude individuals or groups from entry in the first place or ordering those present off
when they are no longer welcome. The common law protects this plenary right through the
tort of trespass, 95 supplemented now by a quasi-criminal prohibitions such as those
contained in Ontario’s Trespass to Property Act:
2. (1) Every person who is not acting under a right or authority conferred
by law and who,
(a) without the express permission of the occupier, the proof of which
rests on the defendant,
(i) enters on premises when entry is prohibited under this Act, or
(ii) engages in an activity on premises when the activity is
prohibited under this Act; or
(b) does not leave the premises immediately after he or she is directed
to do so by the occupier of the premises or a person authorized by the
occupier,
is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than
$2,000.
Colour of right as a defence
(2) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) in respect of premises
that is land that the person charged reasonably believed that he or she
had title to or an interest in the land that entitled him or her to do the
act complained of. 96
Private property owners generally do not need to be concerned with balancing their desires
against the countervailing interests of the wider community in freedom of assembly,
movement, or speech when making determinations as to who to allow onto their land and
under what conditions.97 The general rule here is that “Trespass to Land does not require
95

See, for example, Philip Osborne, The Law of Torts (2nd. ed.) (Toronto: Irwin Law: 2003),
Chapter 4 “Intentional Torts”, Part D, “Intentional Interference With Land: Trespass To Land”.
Property rights can be protected by self-help (using such force as is necessary and reasonable in the
circumstances), injunctive relief, or action for damages.
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the landholder to have a good reason or indeed any reason to exclude a person from his
property” though some qualification may arise even with respect to private property in
cases such as shopping malls, where the owner’s general invitation to the public to enter
gives something of a “public” character to an otherwise “private” place. 98
Constitutional Values & Public Property Ownership
This is somewhat uncertain as the leading case pre-dates the Charter.99 What is not
in the least speculative is that the property rights of public authorities must be exercised in a
fashion consonant with the public law values by which they are bound including those of
both common law constitutionalism and the written constitution. Though the core rights
relating to the management and control of publicly owned property are analogous to those
associated with private property,100 the character of the owner as a public entity imports
constitutional duties and obligations that do not exist in the purely private realm. The
difficulty with respect to public property lies in discerning the appropriate boundary line, in
any particular situation, between competing public interests (efficiency of government
operations and freedom of expression, for example).
Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada
The seminal authority in this respect is the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in
Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada.101 The case arose at Montreal’s
Dorval airport at a time when all major Canadian airports were owned by the Federal
Government. Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé explained the factual background which
provoked the respondents to seek a declaration that their fundamental freedoms had been
violated:
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Osborne, Law of Torts (Op. Cit.)
Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200
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Although control over property is an incident of ownership, the means by which public
ownership rights are exercised is frequently set out in statute, bylaw or regulation. Ontario’s Park
Regulations, for example include the provision:
32. (1) The superintendent may open or close a provincial park, or any portion thereof, to
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(a) preventing overcrowding of the park facilities;
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thereof during a fire, flood or other emergency situation. (R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 952, s. 32).
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On March 22, 1984, respondents Lépine and Deland, respectively the
Secretary and Vice-President of the Committee for the Commonwealth of
Canada, went to Montréal International Airport at Dorval to promote
knowledge of their group and their political goals, and to recruit
members. Equipped with portable placards, advertising leaflets and
magazines, they walked through the first floor of the terminal. They
approached travellers and other passers-by, and while they were informing
them about the goals of the group and soliciting membership, an R.C.M.P.
officer stopped them and asked that they cease their activities. They
objected, at which point the officer took them to the assistant manager of the
airport, who advised them that political propaganda activities such as those
in which they were engaged were unauthorized pursuant to the Government
Airport Concession Operations Regulations, SOR/79-373, which prohibited
any advertising or solicitation in the airport.102
The disposition of the case turned in part on a construction of the relevant section of the
Government Airport Concession Operations Regulations, and in part on an assessment of
the rights of the Government of Canada to inhibit exercises of expression on public
property. All seven justices sitting on the case – Lamer C.J., and La Forest, L’HeureuxDubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, and McLachlin JJ. – took the view that the respondents’
freedom of expression had been improperly infringed. Despite this unanimity of outcome
the case produced multiple judgments.
The Government of Canada had argued that government property became a sort of
“Charter Free zone” through the magic of ownership rights, with the result that
constitutional protections such as freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly, could
be circumvented as an incident of the control of property. Its position was summarized by
Madam Justice McLachlin as being:
that there is no constitutional right to use any of its property for purposes of
public expression. Only with its permission and where it considers it
appropriate should individuals and groups be permitted to speak and
demonstrate. The government submits that as the owner of all such
102
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property, it has the absolute right to exclude the use of the property for
public expression if it chooses. It relies on the fact that the owners of
property are generally entitled to control who enters on it and how it is used,
a right which extends to the right to control expression on their property.
The Crown, it contends, should be placed in no worse position than a private
property owner.103
This position is astonishing: the state owns Parliament Hill, public squares, parks,
legislature grounds, and most of the other sites historically associated with and most suited
to demonstrations, rallies, or protests. The position asserted by the Government of Canada
would have rendered important Charter rights nugatory. Chief Justice Lamer and Mr.
Justice Sopinka rejected the Government’s “absolutist approach to the right of ownership”
outright, noting that restricting the right of freedom of expression “solely to places owned
by the person wishing to communicate” would have the effect of denying “the very
foundation of the freedom of expression.” 104 They emphasized “the special nature of
government property” vis-à-vis public rights and fundamental freedoms.105 To similar
effect, Madam Justice L’Herueaux-Dubé said:
If the government had complete discretion to treat its property as would a
private citizen, it could differentiate on the basis of content, or choose
between particular viewpoints, and grant access to sidewalks, streets, parks,
the courthouse lawn, and even Parliament Hill only to those whose message
accorded with the government's preferences. Such a standard would be
antithetical to the spirit of the Charter, and would stultify the true import of
freedom of expression.106
Similarly, McLachlin J. rejected “the Crown's argument that the government qua proprietor
has the absolute right to prohibit and regulate expression on all property which it owns”
because it:
… is belied by a venerable tradition which supports the view that some types
of state-owned property are proper forums for public expression. The right
103
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of free speech has traditionally been associated with streets and by-ways and
parks -- all government property. To accept the Crown's argument would be
to restrict the freedom guaranteed by the Charter to limits much narrower
than those with which it has traditionally been associated. Little would
remain of the right. Its purpose -- to permit members of society to
communicate their ideas and values to others -- would be subverted.107
Although the court split three ways with no clear majority for any formulation of
approach, the justices were unanimous in their rejection of the Government’s property
rights argument. The principle difficulty became one of determining where and how to
draw the line between appropriate regulation of government owned spaces on the one hand
and constitutionally protected rights on the other. The court focused on the interplay
between section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and section 1’s
limitations. Section 2(b) protects “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of communication”. Section 1 sets out that
“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society”. One presumes from the tenor of the judgments
that sections 2 (a) (“freedom of conscience and religion”), 2 (c) (“freedom of peaceful
assembly”), and 2 (d) (“freedom of association”), the protections contained in the Canadian
Bill of Rights,108 and the long-recognized common law freedom of movement would have
weighed to similar effect had the facts required a consideration of these broader
constitutional protections.
Members of the court differed principally on the question of how best to approach
the balancing of interests that is so obviously required. Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
adopted the position that all government property should, prima facie, be open to free
expression.109 On her approach the necessary balancing of interests would have been
displaced entirely to the point of a section 1 analysis.
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The Chief Justice was of the view that a test of compatibility with function was
needed to determine whether a particular property was of the sort to which section 2(b)
rights should attach:
I am of the view that when a person claims that his freedom of expression
was infringed while he was trying to express himself in a place owned by the
government, the legal analysis must involve examining the interests at issue,
namely the interest of the individual wishing to express himself in a place
suitable for such expression and that of the government in effective
operation of the place owned by it.110
Section 2 (b), his Lordship said, was to be construed as subject to the limitation that “A
person who is in a public place for the purpose of expressing himself must respect the
functions of the place and cannot in any way invoke his or her freedom of expression so as
to interfere with those functions.”111 Both the opportunity for expression and the forms of
expression that are acceptable on state properties were, the Chief Justice concluded,
“circumscribed at least by the very function of the place.”112 Examples of unprotected
forms of expression were said to include shouting in a library, picketing in the middle of a
busy highway, blockading a bridge,113 and hogging the floor at a municipal assembly.114
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Commonwealth of Canada, per Lamer C.J., para. 10
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McLachlin J., for her part, rejected the “compatibility with function” test as too
uncertain in application, but agreed that the heavy lifting involved in sorting out protected
from unprotected expression should not all be left to a section one analysis. For reasons of
legal clarity and also because of “pragmatic considerations” she chose to employ a
“threshold test” founded on a “definitional” approach focused on the “values and interests
at stake” rather than looking to “the characteristics of particular types of government
property” in determining the applicability of section 2 (b) rights in particular
circumstances115: “The state should not be obliged to defend in the courts its restriction of
expression which does not raise the values and interests traditionally associated with the
free speech guarantee.”116 One indicator of places to which section 2 (b) protections should
extend is a “tradition or designation” of a place as being “dedicated to public expression for
purposes of discussing political or social or artistic issues”.117 When the concurrences are
taken into account Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s judgment stood alone, three justices
adopted the position articulated by McLachlin J.’s, and three adopted that of Lamer C.J.118
Spatial Hierarchies of Place
Although the Court divided as to approach there was consensus that the constitution
limits Government attempts to regulate as an incident of property ownership. There was
consensus too that some balancing process was needed at some stage of judicial review in
order to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate regulation of expression on government
property. The outcome of each of the different approaches was a balancing test of sorts that
produced a sliding scale of protections attaching to different sorts of place in different sorts
of circumstances. Even sites to which a high degree of expressive liberty attached in
principle could be regulated for reasons such as the maintenance of law and order.119 All of
the justices took the view that constitutional protection of liberty of expression would
attach most strongly to the types of public property traditionally associated with expressive
activities. The entire court thought that public expression in streets and parks – and
analogous places - are prima facie entitled to a high level of constitutional protection of
115
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freedom of expression.120 Professor Harry Kalven’s formulation was endorsed by both
Chief Justice Lamer and L’Heureux-Dubé, J:
... in an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public
places are an important facility for public discussion and political
process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can commandeer;
the generosity and empathy with which such facilities are made available is
an index of freedom.121
Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s judgment implied a spatial hierarchy,
emphasizing the importance of access “to sidewalks, streets, parks, the courthouse lawn,
and … Parliament Hill…”,122 and also places – such as “…. Bus, train and airport
terminals”123 - that have evolved so as to become “functionally equivalent to other public
thoroughfares, and should therefore be on the same constitutional footing as streets and
parks.” 124 The importance of such places lies in the ease with which large numbers of
people can be approached and the relatively minor inconvenience that normally results.
The symbolic significance of a place also affects the weight to be given to speech rights at
particular locations:
… While the symbolism of a courthouse lawn or Parliament Hill is self-evident,
streets and parks have also acquired special significance as places where one can
have access to and address his or her fellow citizens on any number of
matters. This distinctive attribute does not accrue to a street or a park merely
because of its designation. A park has no intrinsic value as a public arena; it only
obtains this characteristic because the public chooses to frequent parks.125
Though some categories of space may in general lack symbolism it is possible for particular
places to acquire heightened symbolic significance for particular causes that is not shared
by other, seemingly similar, places within the category (park, street, historic site, etc.). In
such cases a heightened constitutional protection may attach.
120
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Conversely, all justices viewed some government property as ill-suited to public
expression. Madam Justice McLachlin asserted that the historical and philosophical
rationales for permitting public property to be used for expressive purposes did not extend
to certain types of site:
… There is no historical precedent, whether in England, the United States or
this country, for extending freedom of expression to purely private areas
merely because they happen to be on government-owned property. Freedom
of expression has not traditionally been recognized to apply to such places or
means of communication as internal government offices, air traffic control
towers, publicly-owned broadcasting facilities, prison cells and judges'
private chambers. To say that the guarantee of free speech extends to such
arenas is to surpass anything the framers of the Charter could have
intended.126
Notion of “Public Forum”
Although the Supreme Court of Canada looked to USA “public forum” law for
guidance, “public forum” doctrine as such was rejected as being too ponderous to be useful,
overly “nominalistic” in approach, overly reliant on formulistic reasoning and rigid
categorizations, and being ill-suited to the framework of Canadian constitutionalism.127
Each member of the court found the criteria set out in the Attorney General of Ontario’s
brief to be helpful. Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé commented:
… when designing “made in Canada” criteria for determining what places
are to be considered public, I am of the view that we should selectively draw
upon some of the American specifications, without importing them
wholesale. As stated, the A.G.O. has suggested that we employ the term
“public arena” to avoid confusion with the American terminology, and has
also offered certain factors to be considered when inquiring as to whether a
given place qualifies. The proposed determinants include:
1. The traditional openness of such property for expressive activity.
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This criterion is not a sine qua non as in the U.S. Absence of
tradition would not preclude the declaration of a public arena,
as the other factors may very well yield the same conclusion.
2. Whether the public is ordinarily admitted to the property as of
right.
3. The compatibility of the property’s purpose with such expressive
activities.
If the activity interfered with the property’s purpose, it would
be less likely to be justified. Properties with multiple
purposes would be problematic under this criterion.
4. The impact of the availability of such property for expressive
activity on the achievement of s. 2(b)’s purposes.
5. The symbolic significance of the property for the message being
communicated.
This is a contextual criterion, linking the property with the
purpose or cause of the demonstration.
6. The availability of other public arenas in the vicinity for
expressive activities.
A property would be more open to activities if no other property was
available.
I find these criteria very valuable. While they are not meant to be
dispositive in any given case, they do provide useful guidelines.128
Impermissible Trespass on Public Property
Whatever the difficulties of application, Commonwealth of Canada clearly
establishes that government property ownership cannot in and of itself provide exemption
from constitutional protections. This is not, however, to say that government regulation of
property is never legitimate. Regulation as property owner/manager that is directed at
limiting violence, ensuring the effective functioning of public facilities, protecting safety,
and so on is acceptable. But attempts to limit public discourse, to control what people can
128
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say or who can speak is another matter. A distinction is generally drawn based on the
extent to which regulation is directed at controlling the content or the consequences of
expression129 and, at the stage of a section one analysis, the tests set out in the Oakes test.130
In evaluating the appropriateness of government regulation of expressive activity the courts
are alive to the fact that there should be more rigorous scrutiny of government regulation
directed to controlling the content of speech than that which is directed to regulating only
the “time, place, and manner” of expression.131 The courts are also alive to the possibility
of colourable state intent lurking behind acceptable forms: regulation of content can be
achieved by means of restrictions that on their face go only to time or manner, while
restrictions on forum or place “may have as their purpose either the controlling of content,
or the avoidance of the consequences of expression regardless of its content.”132
It follows from the fact that the right in question is constitutionally
guaranteed as fundamental in our society that it should be trenched on no
more than is clearly necessary and justified. Only if certain conditions are
established can a limit on a fundamental right or freedom be justified. First,
the state should be required to demonstrate a compelling reason for the
limitation. Second, the limit on the right should not go beyond what is
necessary to achieve that objective -- it should not be overbroad, and should
contain sufficient safeguards to ensure that as the law is applied, the right in
fact will not be infringed more than necessary. This latter danger may
occur, for example, if too much discretion is granted to administrators
[page247] charged with applying the limit or law in question.133

R. v. McBain and Weisfeld v. Canada
The appropriateness of various attempts to regulate expression, assembly, or
movement on government property has been considered by the courts on a number of
129
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occasions. Incompatiblity of function was held to permit staff to evict a protester from
government offices at the end of the working day in R. v. McBain,134 while the removal of
structures from Parliament Hill was upheld in Weisfeld v. Canada 135 - but only on a section
1 analysis.
In that case a “Peace Camp” consisting of shelters and tables and set up as a protest
against USA cruise missiles testing was removed by authorities under an order in council
prohibiting camping, sleeping, or erecting structures on any public work without
Ministerial approval. Linden J.A., for a unanimous court, deemed the Camp, structures and
all, to constitute “expression”:
… expression goes beyond words. People may choose to amplify or
dramatize their messages in many ways: a sandwich board, a soapbox, a
megaphone, a flag, a banner, a placard, a picture, a petition, all can be used
to convey a message or to assist one in conveying a message more
effectively. These "props" are part and parcel of the manner in which one
chooses to express oneself and are as deserving of protection as the words
used to convey the meaning. The Peace Camp structures and the tables used
are, therefore, included in the concept of expression. 136
He concluded that none of the three approaches in Committee for the Commonwealth of
Canada removed the Camp from the protection of section 2 (b) of the Charter. As Madam
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s approach was to include all government property, her test was
easily met. Chief Justice Lamer’s test was met because the existence of the camp or
placing “a tent on Parliament Hill” was not “incompatible with the function or purpose of
that forum”. Finally, “[u]nder the approach advocated by McLachlin J., there is clearly a
link between the principle of participation in social and political decision-making which
underlies our constitutional protection of freedom of expression and the use of the grounds
in front of Parliament to effect such participation.” Because “none of the inherent
limitations within the scope of freedom of expression operate in this case so as to take the
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appellant's conduct outside the protected sphere”,137 it was necessary to assess whether the
infringements of freedom of expression were allowable as limits “prescribed by law” and
“demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society”. The court concluded that the
Government’s exercise of its common law rights against trespass and public nuisance were
on the facts sufficient to meet the requirement that limits be “prescribed by law”. On the
particular facts it found pressing and substantial objectives as well as a rational connection
between those objectives and the impugned measures. The Trial Judge accepted evidence
relating to government concerns about the site’s state symbolism, and matters of safety,
health, maintenance, security, and aesthetics:
62

“There was evidence … that the presence of the

shelter on the grounds of Parliament Hill constituted a
danger. There was a potential fire hazard due to the
employment of open-flame cooking and lighting. There
was a potential health hazard due to the absence of
appropriate sanitary facilities and to the infestation of
the shelter with insects. The shelter interfered with the
proper maintenance of the grounds of Parliament
Hill…. The shelter also imposed an additional burden
on the security forces responsible for the security of the
Parliament Buildings….
63

In addition to these safety, health, maintenance

and security concerns, … One of the Government's
legitimate objectives in this case was to keep the Hill in
a clean and aesthetically pleasing condition….
64

A final government objective which can be

identified is that of preventing the damage that the
permanent presence of the Peace Camp could have on
the symbolic importance of Parliament Hill. …
Parliament Hill is a powerful symbol of Canada,
representing our democratic tradition both to its citizens
137
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and residents, as well as to the millions of visitors who
come to this country each year. As the seat of our
federal system of government, the Parliament Buildings
and the grounds upon which they are situate deserve
respect and admiration from all Canadians. The care and
management of these, the most important institutions of
our democratic society, is vested in the Government and
the Department of Public Works. Their objective is to
maintain these symbols in a manner which accords with
their importance as political institutions and in a
condition to be enjoyed by all Canadians. 138
As the government made no attempt to prevent the appellant from talking to people,
handing out literature, or displaying a banner on Parliament Hill, the Court considered the
impairment of rights to be minimal and, hence, constitutionally permissible.
R. v. Behrens
Two recent Ontario cases also addressed the intersection between the protection of
public property by means of the ordinary law of trespass and constitutionally protected
rights.

In R. v. Behrens139 Quon, J.P. considered a case in which individuals were charged

under Ontario’s Trespass to Property Act when they entered the grounds of the Ontario
legislature (“Queen’s Park”) in order to participate peacefully and lawfully in a protest
against government policies. They had previously been banned from the grounds by the
Speaker as a consequence of an earlier protest during which they had poured water soluble
stage blood on the building. Had this been private property all the elements of the offence
under the Trespass to Property Act would have been fully made out. The question raised
was simply whether their rights of expression, protest, and assembly “trumped” the
Speaker’s ban or vice versa. Applying all three Commonwealth of Canada tests Quon J.P.
concluded that the initial Speaker’s ban had been justified “since the expressive activity is
not the type of expression protected by section 2(b). The government's interest in
preserving public buildings for the benefit of the public is a reasonable limitation on
138
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keeping certain individuals away from public property. This limit is necessary to prevent
further vandalism to public buildings and to stop the activities of people who believe
defacing public property conveys a message.” Section 2 (b) protections do not extend to
“[v]andalism, willful destruction, defacement and destruction of property”.140 Nonetheless,
Quon, J.P., held that, through the protections provided by the Charter, the Speaker’s ban as
ineffective to prevent them from coming onto the property to peacefully take part in a
demonstration.141
R. v. Semple
Similar circumstances arose in R. v. Semple.142 In that case the defendants were
charged under the provisions of Ontario’s Trespass to Property Act for entering the grounds
of Toronto City Hall, from which they had been banned. At the time they were attending a
memorial for a homeless man which segued into a demonstration in support of the
homeless. The issue was simply whether the City of Toronto’s prerogative as a property
owner was outweighed by constitutional protections contained in the Charter. Knazan, J.
found peaceful entry into the square to be a form of expression and that the effect of the
City of Toronto’s notice under the Trespass to Property Act was to violate their Charter
rights.143 In the circumstances this could not be justified under the terms of section 1. 144
Summary and Defences to Trespass
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In sum, private property owners generally have the right to exclude individuals or
groups from access to their property, or to admit them subject to such terms or conditions
as they may wish. The management of government property, however, is constrained by
public law considerations including the requirements of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. Where matters of freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, or freedom
of movement145 are concerned, the government cannot rely upon its property interest to
“trump” its constitutional obligations. Any restrictions on such rights under the guise of
“property management” are subject to legal challenge where they will meet with careful
judicial scrutiny to ensure constitutional propriety. Although Canadian law does not follow
USA “public forum” doctrine, the Canadian constitution calls for heightened scrutiny in the
case of public parks and public streets, analogous locations such as bus stations or airports,
and sites which hold special symbolic meanings in relation to the particular expressive
activity at issue.
Where government entities seek to control access to public property through
trespass law the ordinary rules relating to “colour of right”, and lawful “right or authority”
operate both independently of and in conjunction with constitutional rights. (discussed
further below).
The Use of Injunctions to Constrain Protest
One efficient way to constrain, channel, or prevent protest is through the use of
injunctive relief. Where courts are willing to issue injunctions in the form of instructions to
the public at large to keep out of particular areas, the policing task is simplified. Everyone
entering the area can be arrested without more, and the complicated “remedy” provided by
a criminal law conviction is replaced with the much more straight-forward one of contempt
of court. Injunctions operate like special legislation conferring wide powers on those who
obtain them and stripping important rights from those caught out by them.
MacMillan Blodel Ltd. v. Simpson
British Columbia’s so-called “war in the woods” has been fertile ground for legal
innovation in this area. The “war” was played out during the 1990s environmentalists
attempted to halt logging operations at one site after another. In MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v.
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Simpson,146 a reasonably typical fact situation provided the raw material for an important
legal innovation. Protesters repeatedly blocked roads to prevent logging trucks from
leaving the old growth logging sites of Clayoquot Sound. When the provincial Attorney
General refused to enforce the criminal law against environmental protesters the logging
company sought a remedy through the civil courts: “it brought an action to restrain the
protesters from blocking the roads … It named as defendants … [several individuals and]
"John Doe, Jane Doe and Persons Unknown", seeking damages for trespass, nuisance,
intimidation, interference with contractual relations and conspiracy, as well as injunctive
relief.”147 The next day an interim (ex parte) order was granted, “enjoining `all persons
having notice’ of the order from impeding MacMillan Bloedel's logging operations” on a
particular site. Through a series of further court applications the order was reshaped to
expand its geographical coverage, and adding arrest and detention provisions. It was
converted into an interlocutory injunction which in turn was increased in coverage. This
was followed by a further interim injunction of one year’s duration (later extended)
covering still more territory. 148 The order under consideration on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada took the form of an interim injunction prohibiting named individuals and
“`John Doe, Jane Doe and Persons Unknown’ and `all persons having notice of th[e] Order’
from engaging in conduct which interfered with MacMillan Bloedel's operations at
specified locations”.149 Protesters were ordered to stay at least fifteen feet back from the
roadway and peace officers were “authorized to arrest and remove any person who the
peace officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe is contravening or has
contravened the provisions of this order”.150 Hundreds of people who were not named as
defendants on the Statement of Claim were arrested and convicted under these orders with
penalties for contempt ranging as high as $3,000 in fines and jail terms up to 60 days.151 It
seems that MacMillan Bloedel had no serious intent of pursuing the main action on which
the injunctions were premised.152
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The appellants alleged that this amounted to "`government by injunction’ aimed at
suppressing public dissent”. 153 It was asserted that “private parties cannot use the courts to
curtail the activity of members of the public because private litigation is confined to named,
identifiable parties”. They asserted that violations of the law should be left to the ordinary
law: the Attorney General could “prosecute under the criminal law or seek an injunction in
the public interest.” 154 It was argued too that “courts do not have the jurisdiction to make
orders binding on non-parties” and, hence, that unnamed members of the public could not
be charged with contempt for violating the Court’s orders.155 The Supreme Court of
Canada rejected both arguments. The existence of a possible criminal remedy does not
preclude parties from pursuing civil actions and, illogical though it at first appears,
injunctions are enforceable against third parties provided only that they have notice of the
terms of the court order, that its application is clear, and its terms not unfair or overly
broad.156 A lingering concern (shared by Wood, J.A. in dissent in the B.C. Court of
Appeal) that the injunctions were improper because it is wrong “to use private litigation for
the sole purpose of obtaining an injunction to constrain public action” did not persuade the
Supreme Court of Canada. 157 The equitable remedy of an injunction would fill the “gap”
in circumstances in which the Attorney General, for political reasons, refused to act “in
such a way as to provide the required protection to citizens injured by the conduct of
others”.158 In lay terms, the case for the necessity of injunctive relief had been made out.159
As a full Supreme Court of Canada bench unanimously adopted these views, there
is no doubt as to their authority in Canadian law. The very peculiar circumstances bear
emphasis. First, a civil action had been properly commenced and there was no suggestion
that the ordinary requirements relating to the grant of interlocutory injunctions had not been
153
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met.160 A clear private right was being repeatedly interfered with through mass civil
disobedience (road blockades). Most unusually, the Attorney General had refused outright
to enforce the law. Moreover, the terms of the injunctions issued were clearly and carefully
drafted, drawn up in such a way as to accord wide latitude to the rights of assembly,
expression, and movement of protesters. These rights were limited as little as possible
while still protecting the logging company’s undoubted legal right to conduct its operations.
Public Rights Injunctions
Although the matter of constitutional freedoms arises in many cases where
injunctions are sought the come into particularly clear focus in situations where the
Attorney General seeks to obtain an injunction in order to assert or protect public rights. In
such cases the courts properly seek to ensure that their coercive power is not improperly
invoked in violation of either constitutional rights or the spirit of the ordinary law. Hasty
resort to injunctive relief should not be permitted to circumvent workable but inconvenient
statutory schemes set up to resolve precisely the sorts of issues the injunction seeks to
redress. Not surprisingly, courts have proven unenthusiastic to rush through the door
opened by British Columbia’s “war in the woods”.
A.G. Ontario v. Ontario Teacher’s Federation
Analogous issues were addressed in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario
Teachers' Federation.161 In that case, involving a labour dispute, Mr. Justice McPherson
emphasized
The courts have consistently held that a public rights injunction, brought by the
Attorney General to restrain an alleged statutory breach, will only be granted in
exceptional cases, and in particular where:
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(a) there is repeated flouting of the law following determinations of illegality
by the body entrusted with making those findings, or there is a
serious and established risk to public health and safety
(b) the court is satisfied that the alleged breach of law is clear; and
(c) the enforcement provisions of the statute in question have proven
ineffective.

A.G. British Columbia v. Sager
In British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Sager,162 British Columbia’s Attorney
General sought to prevent protesters from obstructing work to expand a parking lot on
public land at Vancouver Island’s Cathedral Grove Park. The Attorney General began an
“action alleging trespass and seeking damages against 50 Jane Does and 50 John Does” and
brought an application for a “restraining order preventing any persons with notice of the
order from entering on the Land.” 163 The case squarely raised the question of the need to
exhaust other remedies before seeking injunctive relief. The British Columbia Land Act
provided both enforcement mechanism and penalty:
The Land Act contains a statutory penalty for trespass where notice is given.
Under s. 59(1), if a person does anything that is an offence specified in s. 60
the Minister may, on notice to that person, require the person to cease the
unauthorized occupation of the Crown land. Notice may be given by posting
it on the Crown land if the person is unknown. The maximum penalty for
non-compliance with the notice is $1,000, and may be imposed multiple
times. In all cases, a public officer can initiate legal action against a
trespasser, and under the Land Act penalties include fines of up to $20,000
and jail terms of up to six months. The plaintiff has not provided notice in
the form set out in the Land Act and has not utilized the enforcement
provisions in the Land Act. 164
Quijano J. canvassed authorities dealing with the use of injunctions, pointing to the
increasing reluctance of the British Columbia Courts to be drawn into granting injunctive
162
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relief when other, less draconian, remedies had not been exhausted. In one case, McEwan
J. “refused to grant the interlocutory injunction restraining the illegal occupation of a
certain residence owned by the regional district. He held that the order sought was not a
civil claim at all but a form of ad hoc criminal law which had the effect of relieving the
Attorney General and the police of investigative and prosecutorial functions in matters they
deem politically, or otherwise, sensitive, and handing them over to the Court, the effect
being to translate "`what are apparently offences against public order ... into attacks on the
court's authority.’" 165 The defendants in Sager asserted, likewise, that the Attorney
General was acting in such a fashion as to circumvent the statute “and subvert the courts
processes in order to reach an expedient result.” 166 Madam Justice Quijano considered “a
Jane Doe/ John Doe injunction” inappropriate in light of the fact that a full set of remedies
and procedures was provided for under the Lands Act. Despite the obvious need to ensure
compliance with the law, she emphasized the countervailing public interest “in ensuring
that individuals are not denied due process under existing legislation solely on the grounds
that it would be expedient or convenient to do so…. an injunction is a powerful remedy
which may transform a dispute between a citizen and the government into a dispute
between the citizen and the court and it is not to be used as a first choice remedy except in
extraordinary circumstances.” 167
Aboriginal Claims and “Colour of Right”
A peculiar question arises with respect to criminal offences involving property,
trespass and injunctions in the specific context of aboriginal protest. In many cases what
would otherwise seem to be merely a matter of political protest takes on a different
character because aboriginal peoples are uniquely able to claim interest in or ownership of
land which to all external appearances seems to belong to public authorities or (possibly)
others. “Colour of Right” works as a defence to certain criminal charges and in analogous
situations. Thus, in Part XI of the Criminal Code, dealing with “Wilful And Forbidden
Acts In Respect Of Certain Property”, a defence is provided by section 429 (2), which
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provides that “No person shall be convicted of an offence under [specified sections] ….
where he proves that he acted with legal justification or excuse and with colour of right.”
As has been seen, “colour of right” typically also operates as a defence to
prosecution under provincial trespass legislation. A person cannot possibly trespass on
their own land and, hence, cannot have intended to trespass on another’s land if they
believe themselves entitled to be there. Ontario’s Trespass to Property Act, for example,
provides that the defence applies if a person “reasonably” believes “that he or she had title
to or an interest in the land that entitled him or her to do the act complained of.”168 Mr.
Justice Josephson observed in R. v. Penna:
The colour of right defence involves a lack of mens rea. Generally, colour
of right is "an honest belief in a state of facts (or law, as discussed below)
which, if it existed, would be a legal justification or excuse": R. v. Penashue
(1991), 90 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 207 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.). The criminal activity must
be based on an actual mistake, rather than simple ignorance, "advertence
rather than not thinking at all": D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A
Treatise (Carswell: Scarborough, 1995) at 308.169
The belief, however implausible, operates as a defence so long as it is honestly held.
Thus, in R. v. Marion an acquittal was entered on trespass charges on the basis of the
accused’s claim of “colour of right” even where “their asserted belief in their colour of
right … might seem to be more hope than belief”. 170 As the criminal law standard (proof
beyond reasonable doubt) applies, the defendant’s credible assertion sufficed to tip the
scales against conviction. The question concerns the defendant’s honest belief, not actual
ownership or entitlement to use property.171
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To similar effect, in R. v. Potts172 “colour of right” operated as a defence when
Chief Gary Potts of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai nation was charged with mischief for
obstructing construction of a roadway through what were said to be Crown lands. The
Teme-Augama Anishnabai nation claimed title to the lands, viewing the road construction
as “a symbol of the virtual rape of their lands”.173 At the time, however, their claim to title
had however been rejected by the Ontario Courts up to the level of the Court of Appeal.
Moreover, the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had failed to secure an injunction to prevent
construction and, in fact, had been themselves enjoined from interfering. Judge Fournier
concluded that, because of the “ample rulings emanating from the Supreme Court of
Ontario…” Chief Potts would fail an “objective test”. Nonetheless, following R. v.
Ashini,174 the court considered colour of right from an aboriginal viewpoint in assessing the
credibility of the Chief’s testimony as to his state of mind:
From a purely objective point of view… and on the basis of … Canadian
law standards and concepts … Chief Gary Potts could not be said to have
any semblance of "colour of right". But from an appropriate "subjective"
point of view, having regard to his knowledge and belief which … were
based not only on some layman's appreciation of the legal system … but also
… founded on his knowledge of … aboriginal traditions, the answer is not
so readily attainable!
…. He testified that it was his "total belief" that in spite of all these
previous Court rulings, after the Supreme Court of Canada had granted leave
to appeal, they must have done so in recognition that there were flaws in the
lower Court decisions and rulings. He noted that it was his firm belief, that it
was now the Province of Ontario, which was violating its very own legal
system, by insisting that the road go ahead while the Native claim to lands
was awaiting disposition at the Supreme Court level…..

Ct.). (In fact, questions about title to property involve a factual conclusion as to a legal set of
arrangements.)
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…. Mr. Potts, Chief of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai People, could perhaps
be very much mistaken in his reasoning processes as they involved very
sensitive issues, and yet still be honest. 175
Despite what the court said was “a certain degree of unreasonableness in his belief when
objectively considered”, Chief Potts was aquitted on the basis of “colour of right”. 176
The defence is subject to severe limitations, however. Chief Potts’ acquittal was
based on his belief that the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada
signaled that the Canadian legal system would ultimately uphold his peoples’ claim to
aboriginal title, and that the Province was violating its own legal system. Of course, it
means no such thing as lawyers would understand the matter, but that is not the relevant
standard. The standard of honest belief having been met, the outcome had to be acquittal.
The case, however, sets the bar high for those who would run the defence, despite the
courts willingness to consider an aboriginal point of view in assessing an accused’s
subjective state of mind.177 The standard remains that of colour of right under Canadian
and Provincial law.
In R. v. Pena178 Mr. Justice Josephson considered whether the defence should have
been left to the jury on charges arising from British Columbia’s 1995 “Gustafsen Lake”
standoff. The incident arose from circumstances where First Nations sovereignists
overstayed their welcome on privately owned land at the conclusion of a Sundance
ceremony. Members of the group made numerous statements explaining their sense of
entitlement from a sovereignist point of view and denying the authority of both Canadian
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governments and the courts.179 In assessing the relevance of a “colour of right” defence in
these circumstances, Josephson J. derived a three-fold test from previous authorities:
1. The accused must be mistaken about the state of a private law, not a
moral right.
2. That law, if it existed, would provide a legal justification or excuse.
3. The mistaken belief must be honestly held. 180
On the particular facts the defence failed by a wide margin. In fact, no serious attempt had
been made to demonstrate that the defendant’s believed their actions to be compatible with
Canadian law. As a result the evidence introduced in support of the defence did not have
sufficient “air of reality” to warrant leaving the question to the jury. Mr. Justice Josephson
came to three factual conclusions that were fatal to the defence:
…. All the evidence is to the effect that the accused were well aware that
the registered owner of the land was Mr. James or his company. There is no
evidence of anyone asserting a belief that anyone else was the owner of that
land, as recognized by the laws of this Province.
… There is no evidence that any accused harboured an honest mistake
about the laws of this country as they exist, whether public or private, only a
belief as to what the law should be if it were to reflect what they believed to
be their just cause.
There is no evidence to the effect that during the period in the Indictment
any accused held a belief as to a right of occupation of the land for certain
purposes, such as spiritual purposes.181
The contrast between these accused and Chief Potts – who credibly affirmed his belief in
the rule of law and his confidence in the processes then underway in the Supreme Court of
Canada – is palpable.
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Similarly, in two cases arising from aboriginal protests about developments at
British Columbia’s “Sun Peaks” ski resort, a “colour of right” defence failed on what are
essentially credibility grounds. In both R. v. Billy182and R. v. Sauls,183 the accused believed
themselves to have been breaking Canadian law at the relevant times. This, by definition,
is fatal to a colour of right defence, even where unresolved issues of aboriginal entitlement
lurk in the background. Whereas Chief Potts believed the Government of Ontario, its
agents, and, thus, the police to have been violating Canadian law, no understanding entered
the minds of the accused in Billy. They blockaded a road that had been a provincial
highway for 20 years, not a road being newly constructed over traditional lands. Moreover,
the “colour of right” defence would have failed on credibility grounds even in the absence
of an admitted intent to flout the law. In striking contrast to Potts, none of the accused had
attempted “to prove either aboriginal title to the lands or that the lands are Reserve
lands.”184 Although it is important for courts to consider an aboriginal perspective on the
question of land rights there was, on the facts before the court in Billy, neither legal
recognition of the entitlement nor a process under way by which to establish it in the courts:
“an aboriginal right does not exist merely because it has been asserted to exist. There must
be some basis for a belief in the existence of aboriginal title beyond a bare assertion.”185 In
the particular circumstances of the case, the failure of the accused to seek legal redress cast
doubt on the reasonableness of their purported belief in the legality of their actions and,
hence, on their credibility. It bears emphasis that the test is the honesty of belief, not the
existence of parallel proceedings to establish title. Aboriginal entitlement to land varies
tremendously from place to place. What is reasonably to be inferred where a public
highway has existed without legal challenge for two decades might be quite different from
inferences reasonably drawn about credibility in other circumstances.
Similar issues were replayed in R. v. Sauls where, again, the defence of colour of
right failed when each of the accused expressed their disregard for Canadian law: "… the
accused …. did not honestly hold any mistaken belief as to the status of the law. They
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R. v. Billy, [2004] B.C.J. No. 2355; 2004 BCSC 1474 (B.C.S.C.) Cole J.
R. v. Sauls, [2002] B.C.J. No. 3083, 2002 BCPC 638, Sundhu Prov. Ct. J.
184
ibid., para 3, citing from the decision of Dohm, P.C.J., under appeal.
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R. v. Billy, [2004] B.C.J. No. 2355; 2004 BCSC 1474 (B.C.S.C.) Cole J., para. 11.
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disagree with the law and do not feel bound by it, they chose not to comply with it.” 186
Again, the defence would have been on insecure ground even without the admissions.
Neither title nor constitutional matters were issues in the trial. 187 Moreover, it seemed that
the accused acted without the endorsement of either Band Council or traditional elders.188
Their particular protest choreograpy employed battle fatigues, disguise, “aggression,
intimidation, and inflammatory language”189, all of which tended to suggest deliberate
violation of the law rather than its opposite. From the viewpoint of the Canadian legal
system and taken all together, this transformed their behaviour to a form of deliberate civil
disobedience, at best.
In the context of aboriginal rights, then, the “colour of right” defence exists on a
narrow ledge between mere assertion of entitlement at one extreme and full judicial or state
recognition on the other. However deeply held, a belief that sounds in a moral position or
political viewpoint outside of Canadian law will not anchor “colour of right”. At the other
end of the spectrum, the defence, simply, is not needed. The terrain between these two
poles is vast in areal extent but legally limited and somewhat unpredictable. Because both
the history of colonial encounters and the particularities of aboriginal entitlement in
particular places is varied, generalization is dangerous.190 So too, changing judicial
recognition of aboriginal entitlement and kindred obligations on the part of the state, such
as the duty to consult, may move the baseline of rights on which “colour of right” defences
can plausibly be founded.
Summary & Conclusion: Regulating Activities on Public Land
The power of authorities to regulate protest, expression, assembly, and freedom of
movement on public land, thus, raises a number of thorny issues. Public authorities and
public land are bound to comply with the Canadian Constitution, including the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and other forms of rights protection. Thus, ordinary management
186

R. v. Sauls, [2002] B.C.J. No. 3083, 2002 BCPC 638, Sundhu Prov. Ct. J., para. 61.
Sauls, para. 61.
188
Sauls, para. 38.
189
Sauls, para. 62.
190
In Relentless Energy Corp. v. Davis, [2004] B.C.J., No. 2359, 2004 BCSC 1492, Satanove J.,
denied an interim injunction to restrain interference with an access road: “The defendants are not
mere protesters who have no colour of right to set up their camp. They are not First Nations alleging
aboriginal rights of a general and unspecific nature. These defendants are beneficiaries under Treaty
#8 and holders of pre-existing validly issued traplines.” (para 22)
187
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prerogatives are constrained to the extent that significant issues of constitutional
entitlement arise. These most ordinarily lie in the field of expressive rights but might,
conceivably, be relevant in to other sorts of protected rights including those relating to
aboriginal entitlement.191
Thus, whereas it may be quite appropriate to regulate the period of time for which
individuals can camp on public property or to set rules about noise levels, sanitation, and so
on at public campsites, all such regulation must be sensitive to the countervailing public
policy which seeks to protect core freedoms. Though few complications arise with respect
to ordinary users of public property, constitutional considerations come into play as the use
at issue moves from “ordinary” to expressive or from the realm of individual rights to
aboriginal entitlement. Though each is relevant to the important balancing tasks that arise,
none of ancillary police powers, the law of trespass, or the law of injunctions provides an
easy “end-run” around the need for state authorities to respect both common law liberties
and constitutionally protected rights.

191

Egs., sections 25 and 33 of the Constitution Act, 1982:
25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as
to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain
to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October
7, 1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so
acquired.
35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis
peoples of Canada.
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes rights that now exist
by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.

Pue, Trespass & Rights, paper prepared for the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2005-02-04
70 of 96

Appendix

English Translation of
Tremblay c. Québec*

*Translator: Diane G. Cameron, Attorney 4700 Bonavista Ave., Suite 206
Montreal, Quebec H3W 2C5
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Indexed as:

Tremblay vs. Quebec (Attorney General)
Between
Marc F. Tremblay, Plaintiff-Applicant, and
the Attorney General of Quebec, as representative of
the Quebec Police, the Department
of Public Security and the Government of
Quebec, the Attorney General of Canada, as representative
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the
Solicitor General of Canada and the federal Department of Foreign
Affaires and International Trade (Hemisphere Summit
Office and Summit Office) and the Government of Canada,
Quebec City and the Quebec City Police Department,
Defendants-Respondents, and Constance Clara Fogal and
The Defence of Canadian Liberty Committee/
Le Comité de la liberté canadienne (sic), c/o Rocco
Galati, Galati, Rodrigues, Axevedo & Ass., Attorneys,
Intervenants
[2001] J.Q. No. 1504
No. 200-05-014848-019
Superior Court of Quebec
District of Quebec City
Gilles Blanchet J.
Heard: April 9 and 10, 2001.
Rendered: April 18, 2001.
(104 paras.)
Area of law:
Interlocutory injunction – rights and freedoms.
Attorneys:
Marc F. Tremblay, personally
Claude Gagnon (St-Laurent, Gagnon), for the Attorney General of Quebec
René Leblanc and Claude Joyal, for the Attorney General of Canada
Michel Vézina (Boutin, Roy), for Quebec City
Rocco Galati (Galati, Rodrigues, Azevedo & Associates), for the
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FACTS
-

The Summit of the Americas
The Hemisphere Summit Office
The 2001 Quebec City Summit
Security
Steps by the Applicant

ALLEGATIONS OF THE PARTIES
-

The Applicant
The Intervenants
The Respondents

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
(a)

(b)

Interlocutory Injunction and the Charter of Rights
Appearance of Right
Existence of an infringement of the Charter (i) Right to free
movement (ii) Right to be presumed innocent (iii) Freedom of
expression
Justification based on section 1 of the Charter (i) The "important
enough" goal (ii) The choice of reasonable and justifiable means
- Rational connection between the measure and the goal
- So-called “minimal” infringement
- The proportionality test

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
REASONS FOR THE JUDGEMENT ON THE
MOTION FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION
¶1
GILLES BLANCHET J.:— The authorities have set up a substantial security
barrier around the third Summit of the Americas, which Quebec City will host for three
days beginning on Friday April 20th, to protect the 34 participating heads of state, their
delegates and the general public. Among other measures, in the Upper Town there will be a
fenced security perimeter which may only be entered by certified persons (dignitaries,
journalists, Summit employees and police officers) as well as residents, workers,
businessmen and civil servants holding a pass issued by the RCMP.
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¶2
The applicant, a lawyer domiciled in Montreal, is claiming on his own behalf the
right to enter the security zone and move about freely therein, throughout the term of the
Summit to [Translation] “conduct an individual and peaceful demonstration in front of the
Quebec City Convention Centre" [See Note 1 below]. As his request for a pass was denied,
he took an action for a permanent injunction in which he alleged that the security perimeter
for the Summit will interfere with his rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms [See Note 2 below]. Through a motion for an interlocutory
injunction, he asked, firstly, that the security barrier be removed or, subsidiarily, that a pass
be issued giving him access to the site throughout the event.

Note 1: Applicant’s Motion for an Interlocutory Injunction, para. 2.
Note 2: Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (1992) U.K., c. 11).

¶3
Intervenant Constance Clara Fogal, a lawyer practicing law in British Columbia, is
the director of a non-profit organization called "The Defence of Canadian Liberty
Committee/Le Comité de défense de la liberté canadienne", whose main purpose is to
promote the goals, objectives and well-being of Canadian citizens and their constitutional
rights. In particular, the organization’s mission is to ensure, through legal action if
necessary, that the rule of law and the supremacy of Parliament and the Constitution are
maintained, and more particularly with respect to the civil liberties of all Canadians.
¶ 4 At the beginning of the hearing, in a separate preliminary decision, the Court allowed
as a conservatory measure the intervention of Ms. Fogal and the organization she
represents, authorizing both of them to join with the Applicant to assist him, aid his motion
and support his allegations. (Art. 209 C.C.P.)
FACTS
The Summit of the Americas [See Note 3 below]

Note 3: Most of the information in the “Facts” section respecting the Summit of the Americas and the
Hemisphere Summit Office come from the Summit web site: "ameriquescanada.org", various extracts of
which the Applicant cites and produces as Exhibits R-1, R-2, R-3, R-4 and R-6.
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¶ 5 Over the last decade, Canada has participated in two major events bringing together
the democratically elected heads of state from 34 countries in North America, Central and
South America and the Caribbean. The first Summit of the Americas was held in Miami
(U.S.A.) in 1994. At the second Summit, held in Santiago, Chile in 1998, the adoption of an
action plan based on four themes: (1) economic integration, (2) democracy and human
rights, (3) education, (4) poverty and discrimination, was announced. On April 19, 1998, at
the closing of the event, it was announced that the representatives of the western
hemisphere had chosen Canada to host the third Summit of the Americas.
¶6
On December 4, 1999, Prime Minister Chrétien announced that the third Summit
would be held in Quebec City from April 20 to April 22, 2001.
The Hemisphere Summit Office
¶7
Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, in charge of the
matter, set up the Hemisphere Summit Office (HSO), the task of which was to coordinate
various events to be held in the country over a two-year period. From 1999 to 2001,
Canada would be the host of six large hemisphere activities, the culmination of which
would be the Quebec City Summit in the spring of 2001. These activities are:
-

The XIIIth Pan American Games (Winnipeg, July 23 to August 8,
1999);
Conference of Spouses of Heads of State of the Americas (Ottawa,
September 29 to October 1, 1999);
Americas Business Forum (Toronto, November 1 to 3, 1999);
Meeting of trade ministers of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) (Toronto, November 3 and 4, 1999);
Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly (Windsor,
June 4 to 6, 2000)
The third Summit of the Americas (Quebec City, spring 2001).

¶ 8 For each of these events, the role of the Summit of the Americas Office, answering to
the HSO, was to plan, organize and supervise. More specifically, it was responsible for
coordinating consultations between non-profit groups, the private sector, the provinces and
the principal municipalities to set up a schedule of activities, participation and the
collection of money. It was also responsible for coordinating inter-departmental and intergovernmental policies during the preliminary stages and throughout the activities.

Pue, Trespass & Rights, paper prepared for the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2005-02-04
75 of 96

The 2001 Quebec City Summit
¶9
At the 2001 Quebec City Summit, three priorities were to guide discussions between
the heads of state: (1) strengthening democracy, (2) creating prosperity and (3) realizing
human potential. Under the second of these priorities, creating prosperity, the Summit
organizers included on the agenda the negotiation of a “Free-Trade Area of the Americas”
(FTAA). According to Marcel Belleau, UQAM researcher associated with the RaoulDandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, such negotiation was one of the main
goals of the upcoming Summit [See Note 4 below], which placed the highly controversial
issue of globalization at the centre of the event.
Note 4:

Affidavit of Marcel Belleau, par. 15.

¶ 10
In the most recent issue of the magazine L'Actualité [See Note 5 below], journalist
Pierre Cayouette summarizes as follows the main issues surrounding globalization:

Note 5: April 15, 2001 edition, "One Step, One Continent", part of a report entitled "Should We Be Afraid
of the FTAA?", on page 23.

[Translation]"The democratically elected heads of state in North America,
South America, Central America and the Caribbean, with the exception of
Cuba, represent a market of 800 million consumers and a combined gross
domestic product (GDP) of $11 trillion. These countries have agreed to
progressively eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers and all measures which
limit trade of goods, services and capital between them. No later than 2005,
according to the schedule they have set up, the leaders will have created a
free-trade zone from Anchorage, Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.”
¶ 11

Then the commentator describes the controversy in the following terms:
[Translation]"The FTAA will guarantee prosperity for all signatories, from
Haiti to the United States, according to its proponents. Its critics are worried,
however. (…) They fear that the new free-trade agreement will eventually
allow the private sector to intervene in activities historically reserved for
governments. Their greatest concern involves the “services” area, such as
education and health, which would become “markets” open to competition
by local or foreign private companies. They predict that, within the next few
years, American healthcare companies will be doing business in Quebec or
elsewhere in America, without being restricted by laws or regulations.”
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¶ 12 Since the announcement that the Summit would be held in Quebec City, several
international economic meetings have been the stage for at times violent confrontations
between the police and factions or groups opposed to increased globalization.
¶ 13
In only two years, the economic summits held in Seattle, Cologne, Washington,
Windsor, Calgary, Prague, Montreal, Nice and Davos were the setting for confrontations
which derailed them to varying degrees. For example, the ministerial conference of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), held in Seattle in November 1999, and the meeting of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, held in Prague in September
2000, were the target of massive demonstrations ranging from peaceful to more violent by
organized groups of demonstrators.
¶ 14
All these economic meetings, most of which brought together ministerial and
administrative delegations, have never united in one place as many heads of state as the
Quebec Summit will: over one hundred political figures having international protection
under Canadian law, including 34 heads of state, several accompanied by their families and
dignitaries from their respective countries. In all, 9,000 participants, including
ambassadors, representatives of hemispheric organizations and delegates from various
sectors of society from invited countries, will attend.
Security
¶ 15
The section respecting security measures on the Summit Office web site, under the
heading “Information for citizens”, begins as follows:
[Translation] "For the Summit of the Americas, the choice of security
measures takes into account the sometimes violent events experienced
during recent similar international summits."
¶ 16

And continues as follows:
[Translation]"The police base their work on two goals:
- to provide complete security for everyone—delegates, visitors and
residents;
- to minimize as much as possible the adverse effects on people’s
lives, their movement and the democratic expression of individuals
and groups.

¶ 17
Of all the protection measures adopted for the Summit, the setting up of a security
perimeter is without a doubt the most spectacular and the most controversial. The Summit
web site discusses it as follows:
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[Translation] “For the duration of the Summit, a fenced-in security area, with
controlled access points, will surround Old Quebec City and an adjacent
area. It is normal procedure when planning security measures of this scope.
The main purpose of the security zone is:
-

to control the movement of crowds to official sites;
to protect people and property in the area in question."

¶ 18 For access inside the barrier and to official sites throughout the Summit, two
separate procedures have been set up: a “pass” for residents, workers, merchants and civil
servants, and “accreditation” reserved for delegates, journalists, employees and police
officers.
¶ 19 The RCMP, the Quebec Police, the Quebec City Police Department and the City of
St. Foy Department of Public Security, combined under an operations committee for the
maintenance of order, will oversee together the safety of participants and others during the
Summit. This represents over 6,000 police officers, 3,200 of whom are RCMP. These
police organizations work together but each one is given a specific role relating to its usual
responsibilities. Accordingly, the RCMP is responsible for security for heads of state and
official delegations during their stay in Canada. The RCMP also looks after accreditation of
Summit participants.
Steps by the Applicant
¶ 20 Although he does not belong to any of the categories of persons eligible to enter the
site during the Summit, the Applicant wishes to be authorized to do so to demonstrate
“individually and peacefully”. On January 29, 2001, when he telephoned the Quebec City
Police Department to obtain a permit, an officer, Lieutenant André Tanguay, told him that
no demonstration would be authorized within the security perimeter. The same day, the
Applicant nevertheless filled in a demonstration permit application which he sent by fax
with a letter addressed to Lieutenant Tanguay (R-8) in which he wrote, among other things:
[Translation] "The demonstration I would like to carry out is individual and
peaceful. The purpose of my demonstration is not to prevent in any manner
whatsoever the holding of the Summit, to prevent anyone from entering the
Convention Centre or any other place or to disturb the peace or interfere with
the movement of the various dignitaries or other people attending the
Summit of the Americas."
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¶ 21 On January 31st, two days after his fax was sent, the applicant received a letter from
Lieutenant Tanguay (R-9) by return fax informing him that his request had been sent to the
operations committee for the maintenance of order (RCMP, QMP, QP and QCPD), which
would analyze it and which should be able to answer it by February 28th. The day before
this deadline, February 27th, Lieutenant Tanguay sent the Applicant by mail a letter (R-10)
which reads as follows:
[Translation] "Dear Mr. Tremblay,
We are writing further to our letter dated January 31, 2001.
Your application does not fall within municipal by-laws. As a result, we are
unable to allow it.
Yours very truly,
¶ 22 Before receiving this correspondence, which was delayed due to a postal code
error, the Applicant spoke by telephone to Lieutenant Tanguay, who suggested he contact
the RCMP to obtain a pass.
¶ 23 The same day, February 28th, the Applicant telephoned the RCMP, where a Ms.
Brongel, in charge of communications, told him that passes for the Summit are reserved for
residents, merchants and workers who carry out their activities or live within the perimeter.
When he asked to whom he could write at the RCMP to make his request official, Ms.
Brongel referred him to Sergeant Jean Lemieux, to whom he sent a letter the same day in
which he essentially repeated his letter dated January 29th to the Quebec City Police
Department. When he filed his injunction proceedings on March 20, 2001, he had still not
received an answer to his letter to Sergeant Lemieux, whom he had unsuccessfully
attempted to reach by telephone on March 5th.
ALLEGATIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Applicant
¶ 24
In his action, the Applicant attacks the constitutional validity of the unusual
security measures set up for the Quebec City Summit. The security perimeter and
prohibited access for persons not residing or working on the site infringes certain rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, namely “the right to free movement,
freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly” and “the right to be presumed innocent”
[See Note 6 below]. In the motion for an interlocutory injunction filed with his request for a
permanent injunction, he is asking the Court to order the Respondents:
Note 6: Supra, note 1. The Applicant cites in particular sections 2 b), 2 c), 6 (2) a), 7 and 11 d) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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[Translation]- "not to build and/or install the Perimeter;
- to immediately cease installation of the Perimeter;
- not to prevent demonstrations, including that of the PlaintiffApplicant near places where the Summit of the Americas will take
place, and in particular in front of the Quebec City Convention
Centre;"
¶ 25 Subsidiarily, if his main conclusions are not allowed, the Applicant is asking that
an interlocutory injunction be issued ordering the Respondents, and in particular the
RCMP, to issue [Translation] “a pass in the name of the Plaintiff-Appellant for the duration
of the Summit of the Americas, allowing him to enter inside the Perimeter and thus
demonstrate”. The injunction sought would also order the Respondents, the Quebec Police
and the Quebec City Police Department in particular, [Translation] “to allow the PlaintiffAppellant free and unrestricted movement in public places located within the Perimeter”.
The Intervenants
¶ 26
In their formal intervention proceedings, the Defence of Canadian Liberty
Committee and its director, Constance Clara Fogal, limited themselves to supporting the
principal and subsidiary demands of the Applicant. In the notes and authorities of their
lawyers, however, it was suggested that the Court provide for a certain number of middle
ground measures intended to provide more guidance for police control on the Summit site,
including:
(c)

any such other acceptable proposal, coming from the Respondents,
subject to the approval of the Court on the submissions and response
of the parties, keeping the following rights and interests of the
Applicants intact:
(i) entry into the zone not be restricted by accreditation and passes;
(ii) that a substantial minimum number of citizens be allowed entry
per day in proportion to the Summit attendees;
(iii) that once entered, movement is not restricted save for security
corridors on roads used to transport to Summit sites and security
corridors to the access points; provided that,

the security corridors in (iii) above, not be so designed as to remove the
visual and audio range between the dissenters and the Summit attendees.
¶ 27 Although they did not form part of a formal contestation, the suggestions contained
in the notes and authorities of the Intervenants might nonetheless have to be taken into
account, as they propose a middle ground between the extreme options open to the Court,
namely fully granting the motion in its main conclusion or dismissing it outright.
The Respondents
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¶ 28 As the motion was contested verbally, the position of the Respondents is found in
their affidavits and the notes and authorities of their attorneys. Essentially, their position is
that, in view of the principles governing a motion for an interlocutory injunction in
constitutional matters, the Applicant and the Intervenants are not entitled to the remedy
sought.
¶ 29 On the one hand, the evidence offered at this stage is not sufficient to establish the
necessary appearance of right or the existence of a material issue to be decided. The
contested security measures do not constitute an infringement of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter, which are not absolute, and they can at any rate a priori be
justified in a free and democratic society, given the security requirements dictated by the
importance and size of the event. Also, if there is in fact a material issue to be decided, the
balance of convenience, considered with a view to the public interest, requires that the
entire motion be dismissed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
¶ 30 In its main motion for a permanent injunction, the applicant specifically seeks the
continuance of the orders in the conclusions of his motion for an interlocutory injunction,
namely the elimination of any security barrier around the Summit site, with the right for
anyone to freely move about therein in order to demonstrate or, subsidiarily, the issuing to
him of a pass giving him access to the site for the same purposes. In fact, under both the
principal heading and the subsidiary heading, the only substantive conclusion of the motion
reads as follows:
[Translation] "Issue a permanent injunction to the same effect as the
interlocutory injunction;”
¶ 31
It should be recalled that the Quebec City Summit is only held over a three-day
period, from April 20 to 22, 2001, after which the request for a permanent injunction will
have no practical effect and its only goal would be to obtain, after the fact, a declaration
that a security fence set up by the police was unlawful.
¶ 32
In theory, no rule of law opposes the issue of an interlocutory injunction order, the
final and irrevocable effect of which would deprive of any practical effect the request for a
permanent injunction, as is the case each time the remedy sought relates to a specific event
which is imminent and defined in time. To reach this result, however, the Applicant must
successfully pass the three-stage test established by the case law in this matter.
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Interlocutory Injunction and the Charter of Rights
¶ 33
In RJR-MacDonald inc. v. Canada (Attorney General et al) [See Note 7 below], the
Supreme Court of Canada recalled in the following terms the general rules applying to an
interlocutory injunction:
Note 7:

[1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, p. 335.

"Metropolitan Stores [See Note 8 below] adopted a three-stage test for courts
to apply when considering an application for either a stay or an interlocutory
injunction. First, a preliminary assessment must be made of the merits of the
case to ensure that there is a serious question to be tried. Secondly, it must be
determined whether the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the
application were refused. Finally, an assessment must be made as to which
of the parties would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the
remedy pending a decision on the merits."
Note 8: Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110.

¶ 34 A more in-depth study of the Metropolitan Stores decision (cited above), rendered
in 1987, shows that the first stage must take the form of a preliminary and provisional
evaluation of the merits of the dispute. This exercise consists in asking whether the party
asking for the injunction is able to establish a sufficient appearance of right or, according to
a more recent formulation, to convince the Court of the existence of a serious issue to be
decided, as opposed to a request which is purely frivolous or vexatious.
¶ 35 The leading cases of RJR-MacDonald and Metropolitan Stores, moreover,
introduce two additional elements which the Court must take into account in its analysis of
a motion for an interlocutory injunction based on the alleged infringement of rights
guaranteed by the Charter.
¶ 36
It follows from these decisions that, on the one hand, in constitutional matters, an
interlocutory injunction and stay of proceedings should not be granted unless the public
interest is taken into consideration in deciding on the balance of convenience, at the same
time as the interest of the private litigants.
¶ 37

On this issue, in RJR-MacDonald (cited above), the Court held on page 344:
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"It is, we think, appropriate that it be open to both parties in an interlocutory
Charter proceeding to rely upon considerations of the public interest. Each
party is entitled to make the court aware of the damage it might suffer prior
to a decision on the merits. In addition, either the applicant or the respondent
may tip the scales of convenience in its favour by demonstrating to the court
a compelling public interest in the granting or refusal of the relief sought.
"Public interest" includes both the concerns of society generally and the
particular interests of identifiable groups."
(Emphasis added)
¶ 38 The second aspect specific to interlocutory motions based on the Charter involves
the first stage of the analysis, namely the search for an appearance of right or a material
issue to be decided. This aspect of the issue warrants a word of explanation.
¶ 39 Basing himself on RJR-MacDonald (cited above), at pages 335 to 338, the
Attorney General of Canada insists on the rule that the Court, whether or not a matter
involves the Charter, should avoid entering into an in-depth analysis of the merits of the
request at the preliminary stage of a motion for an interlocutory injunction. In this part of
the MacDonald decision, Sopinka and Cory JJ., speaking for the Court, observe that:
"Furthermore, the complex nature of most constitutional rights means that a
motions court will rarely have the time to engage in the requisite extensive
analysis of the merits of the applicant's claim. This is true of any application
for interlocutory relief whether or not a trial has been conducted."
¶ 40 This comment of the Court seems to be in keeping with the specific perspective of
validating the lessening of the burden of proof of the Applicant for an interlocutory
injunction in a Charter case already proposed by the American Cyanamide [See Note 9
below] and Metropolitan Stores [See Note 10 below] cases. Sopinka and Cory JJ. also add,
on page 338:
Note 9:

(1975) 1 All E.R. 504.

Note 10: (1987) 1 S.C.R. 110.

"Once satisfied that the application is neither vexatious nor frivolous, the
motions judge should proceed to consider the second and third tests, even if
of the opinion that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed at trial. A prolonged
examination of the merits is generally neither necessary nor desirable."
(Emphasis added)
¶ 41 However, under the principle requiring a brief analysis of the right alleged at the
interlocutory stage, Sopinka and Cory JJ. make an important distinction, which is clearly
relevant to this case. On page 338, they state:
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" Two exceptions apply to the general rule that a judge should not engage in
an extensive review of the merits. The first arises when the result of the
interlocutory motion will in effect amount to a final determination of the
action. This will be the case either when the right which the applicant seeks
to protect can only be exercised immediately or not at all, or when the result
of the application will impose such hardship on one party as to remove any
potential benefit from proceeding to trial."
(Emphasis added)
¶ 42 Circumstances justifying the application of the exception are rare, but when they
occur, as in the case before us, a court must conduct a more in-depth examination of the
merits of the case. It is not a question, however, of subjecting the arguments of the parties
to the exhaustive analysis required at the stage of the hearing on the merits, as only a full
trial will allow this to be done with a reasonable degree of certainty. Moreover, if the
analysis by a judge allows him to identify at least one material issue to be decided, he must,
at the second and third stage of the analysis, “take into account the expected results on the
merits” [See Note 11 below].
Note 11:

RJR-MacDonald, supra note 7, at page 339.

1) Appearance of Right (or material issue to be decided)
¶ 43 The Court will now deal with the request of the Applicant in view of the specific
rules set out above. Thus, at the first stage of the analysis, the search for an appearance of
right or a material issue to be decided, we must first question the very existence of an
infringement of or limit on any of the fundamental rights alleged and then, where
applicable, ask in what way the Respondents may, at the hearing on the merits, show that
the restrictions or infringements identified are reasonable or justified “in a free and
democratic society”.
(a) Existence of an infringement of the Charter
¶ 44 As we have seen, the motion argues that the security arrangements for the Summit
infringe three fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter: (1) the right to free movement,
(2) the right to be presumed innocent and (3) the right to freedom of expression and
peaceful association.
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(i) Right to free movement
¶ 45 Section 6 of the Charter is under a specific heading, “Mobility Rights”. Sub-section
(2) states that:
" Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a
permanent resident of Canada has the right
a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and
b) to pursue the gaining of livelihood in any province.
¶ 46 This provision is not relevant to this case. Its purpose is to grant all Canadians and
residents rights resulting from the fact that they belong to a single country [See Note 12
below] and it only contemplates discrimination based on the province of origin [See Note
13 below].

Note 12: Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591.
Note 13: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357.

¶ 47 Strictly speaking, in the particular circumstances of this case, the right to freedom
of movement claimed by the Applicant could be based on section 7 of the Charter, the first
sub-section of which guarantees everyone “the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice”. It has been held that the guarantee of freedom found in this provision
could be infringed when persons wishing to attend a sports event were prevented by strikers
who had blocked entrances to the facility where the event was being held [See Note 14
below]. Note that, in that case, the Charter could be invoked because the local police had
approved the picket line protocol.

Note 14: Ogden Entertainment Services v. U.S.W.A., Local 450, (1998), 159 D.L.R. (4th) 340 (Ontario),
(1998) 52 C.R.R. (dd) 347 (Appeal dismissed at C29462 June 1, 1998, 38 O.R. (3d) 448).

¶ 48 Beyond the apparent analogy one could make between that case and the one before
us, there are fundamental distinctions between them on the facts, and in particular those
affecting justification of the limit imposed on freedom of movement. We will return later to
this concept which calls for the justification test set out in section 1 of the Charter.
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(ii) Right to be presumed innocent (s. 11 d) and 7)
¶ 49 As indicated by the very wording of section 11 d), and as confirmed by the extracts
of the Oakes case [See Note 15 below] on which the Applicant relies (pages 119 and 120),
the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Charter is intended for persons charged
with or accused of an offence, which is not the case here. Moreover, nothing in the motion
or in the evidence suggests that the pass requested by the Applicant was denied because it
was assumed that he would participate in an offence which had been or would be
committed in connection with the Summit of the Americas.
Note 15:

[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.

¶ 50
In short, if the security fence set up by the Summit authorities infringes the rights
and freedoms of the Applicant himself or any other Canadian citizen, it does not infringe
the right to be presumed innocent guaranteed by section 11 d) of the Charter.
(iii) Freedom of expression
¶ 51 Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms gives special status to
the four so-called “fundamental” freedoms:
a)
b)
c)
d)

freedom of conscience and religion;
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom
of the press and other media of communication;
freedom of peaceful assembly;
freedom of association.

¶ 52 With rare unanimity, since the adoption of the Charter as an integral part of our
Constitution, the Supreme Court has continually insisted on the importance of the courts
jealously protecting freedom of expression, on which the foundations of a truly democratic
society are based.
¶ 53 On page 172 of Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada [See Note
16 below] L'Heureux-Dubé J. writes:
Note 16:

[1991] 1 S.C.R. 139.

"The liberty to comment on and criticize existing institutions and structures
is an indispensable component of a "free and democratic society". It is
imperative for such societies to benefit from a multiplicity of viewpoints
which can find fertile sustenance through various media of communication."
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¶ 54

She adds:
“The alternatives are particularly frightening. History is replete with
examples of entrenched groups which have sought to maintain their elevated
station by suppressing emerging and challenging new thoughts and ideas.
Stifling opponents by revoking their right to express dissent and
disenchantment may have produced desired results in the short run, but
ultimately all such attempts led to insurrection and rebellion."

¶ 55 On page 182, she cites with approval the following comment of Cory J., then with
the Ontario Court of Appeal, in R. v. Kopyto [See Note 17 below]:
Note 17:

(1987) 24 O.A.C. 81, at pages 90-91.

"... it is difficult to imagine a more important guarantee of freedom to a
democratic society than that of freedom of expression. A democracy cannot
exist without the freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions
about the functioning of public institutions. These opinions may be critical of
existing practices in public institutions and of the institutions themselves.
However, change for the better is dependent upon constructive criticism. Nor
can it be expected that criticism will always be muted by restraint."
(Emphasis added)
¶ 56 Referring to the caustic tone of the words attributed to Respondent Kopyto,
declared guilty of contempt of Court for suggesting that the police and the courts were not
independent of each other, Cory J. added:
Frustration with outmoded practices will often lead to vigorous and
unpropitious complaints. Hyperbole and colourful, perhaps even
disrespectful language, may be the necessary touchstone to fire the interest
and imagination of the public, to the need for reform, and to suggest the
manner in which that reform may be achieved."
(Emphasis added)
¶ 57
In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) [See Note 18 below], Dickson C.J.
observed that:
Note 18:

[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.

" Freedom of expression was entrenched in our Constitution and is
guaranteed in the Quebec Charter so as to ensure that everyone can manifest
their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all expressions of the heart and
mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream. Such
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protection is, in the words of both the Canadian and Quebec Charters,
"fundamental" because in a free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize
a diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the
community and to the individual."
(Emphasis added)
¶ 58
In this case, none of the Respondents question the fundamental, although not
absolute, nature of the freedoms guaranteed by section 2 of the Charter, so it seems
pointless to discuss this principle further.
¶ 59 The Attorneys General of Canada and Quebec suggest, however, that, due to the
particular function given during the Summit to a specific area of Quebec City, the freedom
of expression which would normally be allowed would not apply during the event, given
the security requirements dictated by the situation. In the opinion of the Court, this
consideration related to the function of the premises involves another aspect of the debate.
It does not seem relevant at this preliminary stage of the analysis, which consists of
determining whether we are faced with any restriction of a fundamental right, the
justification of which restriction in view of section 1 must be appreciated at a later stage of
the proceeding.
¶ 60 The streets, sidewalks and areas in the Upper Town of Quebec City have always
been public places, where any citizen should be able to express himself by any means
available to him, unless doing so infringes a valid legislative or regulatory provision. For
three days, beginning on Friday, April 20th, the politicians have decided to hold on this
public territory, rather than on government property, a huge economic international
relations operation, bringing together in the downtown core the heads of state of 34
countries in the three Americas, an unprecedented event in Canada.
¶ 61 Well before similar summits held in Seattle and Prague, in particular, the very
scope of the proposed event suggested the need for tight security measures which, for a few
days, would significantly disrupt the daily life of citizens.
¶ 62 We should note that it is not up to the Court to make a value judgement on the
advisability of the site chosen for the third Summit of the Americas, nor on the economic,
social or political stakes inherent in the negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), chosen as the main theme of the upcoming Quebec City Summit. At this stage, the
issue is only whether, by setting up a tight security perimeter around a large area of Quebec
City, the authorities could rightly or wrongly infringe in any manner the exercise of a
fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Charter.
¶ 63 The Court categorically answers this question in the affirmative with respect to
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, hence the need to now conduct a serious,
although not exhaustive, analysis of the factors which could justify the limit in question
based on section 1 of the Charter.
(b) Justification based on section 1 of the Charter
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¶ 64
In R. v. Oakes [See Note 19 below], the Supreme Court set out the principle that
any restriction on the exercise of a freedom guaranteed by the Charter must meet two
criteria to remain within "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society" [See Note 20 below].
Note 19:
Note 20:

(1986) 1 S.C.R. 103, 50 C.R. (3d) 1.
Section 1 of the Charter.

¶ 65 Firstly, the intended goal of the limit must be "important enough" to contravene a
constitutional guarantee. Also, the means chosen to reach such goal must be reasonable
and their justification shown according to the so-called "proportionality" test, which has
three components: (1) the presence of a rational connection between the proposed measure
and the goal to be reached, (2) the search for a limit which, despite its necessity, limits
freedom of expression "as little as possible" and (3) proportionality between the effects of
the proposed measure and the goal identified as "important enough" to limit freedom of
expression [See Note 21 below].

Note 21: Op. cit.; see to the same effect R. v. Edwards Brooks & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 30 C.C.C.
(3d) 385, 55 C.R. (3d) 193 and Irwin Toys Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.

¶ 66
In a case brought only a few months after Oakes (cited above), the Supreme Court
reformulated the rule for the sole purpose of specifying that, at the last stage of the test, a
court asked to decide on the request must assess the proportionality not only between the
harmful effects of the measure taken and the goal pursued, but also between the harmful
effects and the beneficial effects of that same measure. [See Note 22 below] This nuance,
as we can see, introduces into the proportionality test of section 1 the notion of "balance of
convenience", until then reserved for the third stage of the required analysis for
interlocutory injunctions.

Note 22: Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.
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¶ 67 Thus, as section 1 of the Charter gives the authority the burden of proving that its
infringement of a guaranteed right is justified in a free and democratic society, it is useless
to repeat the examination of the balance of convenience at the third stage of the
examination of the motion for an injunction if the authority could meet this test at the first
stage, which consists of determining whether the Applicant could show an appearance of
right or the existence of a material issue.
¶ 68
In the case at bar, one of the arguments of the Intervenants suggests that, to meet
their burden of proof under section 1, the Respondents should not only show that the
disputed security measures are reasonable limits which can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society, but also that such measures are expressly prescribed or
authorized in a law or regulation. This reasoning is based on the expression "rule of law"
used in the wording of section 1, and on certain extracts from the notes of Wilson J. in
McKinney v. University of Guelph (1990) 3 S.C.R. 229, on page 386 [See Note 23 below].
Note 23:

See the notes and authorities of the Intervenants, page 21.

¶ 69 As a general rule in such matters, Canadian case law is to the effect that a limit on
the rights and freedoms may be authorized by a "rule of law", within the meaning of section
1, not only in the case where it is expressly provided for by statute or regulation, but also
when it results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its
operating requirements or results from the application of a common law rule [See Note 24
below]. In the case of both a police initiative and a specific statute or regulation, the
legitimacy of the infringement of a fundamental right is related to the goal sought:

Note 24: R. v. Twain (sic), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933; R. v. Thompsen (sic), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640; Cloutier v.
Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158.

"The interference with liberty must be necessary for the carrying out of the
particular police duty and it must be reasonable, having regard to the nature
of the liberty interfered with and the importance of the public purpose served
by the interference." [See Note 25 below].
Note 25: Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, at p. 181.

¶ 70
In this case, the Court cannot disregard the duties imposed on the RCMP under
section 18 of the Act establishing it [See Note 26 below], read in conjunction with sections
2 b) and 6 of the Security Offences Act [See Note 27 below] and with section 2 of the
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Criminal Code [See Note 28 below], which defines which persons enjoy international
protection.

Note 26: Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S. chap. R-9 (R-10).
Note 27:
Note 28:

R.S., chap. S-7 (1984, ch. 21, s. 56).
R.S. chap. 34.

¶ 71 Moreover, from a practical point of view, the approach suggested by the
Intervenants would amount to systematically prohibiting the application of the justification
test in section 1 of the Charter to any police initiative of a preventive nature. This would be
tantamount to admitting that, even in circumstances justifying it in the opinion of everyone,
no emergency protection measure taken by the police would be constitutionally acceptable
if it included an even minor limit on the fundamental freedoms of a single person.
¶ 72 That said, we will see here to what extent section 1 might justify an infringement of
the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly by the building of a security fence in the
Upper Town of Quebec City.
(i) The "important enough" goal
¶ 73 The Quebec City Summit of the Americas is the biggest international political
event ever organized by the government of Canada. It is part of the discussions and
multilateral reports which form an essential aspect of this country’s foreign policy and a
crucial tool for promoting its values and interests. The 9,000 Summit participants include
not only heads of state, diplomats and other dignitaries, but also over 2,500 Canadian and
foreign journalists and support staff from all types of media around the world: the written
press, official news agencies, radio and television.
¶ 74 Although it is unnecessary for the moment to take into account the concerns of the
police in view of the worldwide controversy surrounding the principle of free trade, to
which we will return, we must make the following observation: the scope of the event
alone requires the Canadian authorities to set up, jointly with the province and Quebec City,
measures to ensure not only the physical and material safety of participants and the
population, but also the proper conduct of Summit activities, for three days only.
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¶ 75 At this stage, the unusual size of the Quebec City Summit of the Americas leads us
to conclude in the existence of an "important enough" goal to justify the authorities
infringing certain fundamental freedoms, although we must now examine the relative
proportionality of such infringements according to the test suggested by the Supreme Court
in the Oakes case (cited above).
(ii) The choice of reasonable and justifiable means
¶ 76 As we saw above, the Court must assess the authority’s decisions from three points
of view: (1) the presence of a rational connection between the proposed measure and the
goal to be reached, (2) the search for a limitation which, despite its necessity, is the "least
possible" and (3) the proportionality between the positive effects of the proposed measure,
the goal to be reached and the negative effects of that same measure.
Rational connection between the measure and the goal
¶ 77 The recent experiences in Prague and Seattle, among others, have clearly shown
that in the current context of the opposition to globalization, the holding of a large-scale
economic summit unfortunately requires that the area in which the invited delegates will
have to move be closed in by a tight security perimeter. The principle is to avoid as much
possible a potentially explosive confrontation between the police and a group of
demonstrators among which there are some bad apples who cannot be unmasked and
controlled.
¶ 78 We will see below, when we analyse the proportionality of the security measures,
the contemporary particularities of maintaining order at international meetings involving
economic issues.
¶ 79
In Quebec City, because of the particular topography of the area, the number of
participants and the fact that the meeting sites and lodging areas are spread out, a
significant area of the Upper Town, including the Old City, must be included in the
perimeter. For the same reasons, we cannot exclude from the area throughout the event the
many people who live or work there, hence the need to provide for, in addition to the
already significant amount of local traffic, the safe movement of around thirty foreign
delegations whose convoys will use over 400 official vehicles, not to mention an equal
quantity of emergency vehicles, those of the police, taxis, support vehicles, those of
suppliers and, lastly, those of residents and merchants.
¶ 80 According to Henri Dion, the RCMP superintendent in charge of the Summit, the
number of people who will move within the perimeter each of the three days of the event is
estimated to be 32,000. The possible number of demonstrators at the Summit was estimated
a few weeks ago to be 20,000 and, according to recent news reports, this estimate could be
very conservative, as was the case for the Seattle summit in 1999.
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¶ 81
In this context, there is no doubt that there is a rational connection between the
adopted measures and the goal to be reached . That said, did the authorities try to limit as
much as possible the constraints imposed by the security perimeter on the population in
general and, in particular, on all citizens who, like the Applicant, wanted to demonstrate
peacefully at such an important political event as the third Summit of the Americas?
So-called “minimal” infringement
¶ 82 Other than the significant inconvenience which results for residents and merchants
in the area, the security perimeter ensures that citizens wishing to merely attend the event or
demonstrate peacefully are kept back a good distance from the centre of activity. In the
particular case of the demonstrators, the measure makes any visual or auditory
communication with the people they would like to reach, namely the 34 heads of state
participating in the negotiation of the FTAA, impossible.
¶ 83 The Director General of the Summit of the Americas Office, Denis Ricard, was
appointed to this position in January 2000, his role being to guide and coordinate the action
of around 250 permanent employees whose duties affect the entire organization, operational
support and logistics surrounding the holding of the Summit. It is a very complex matter,
the smallest ramifications of which extend well beyond what the average citizen might
reasonably imagine for an event of this nature.
¶ 84 Through the Office, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has
developed or participated in setting up various measures to accommodate the interest and
lobby groups concerned about the issues raised at the Summit. These measures include:
-

The existence of alternative sites for demonstrations;
Invitations to the Summit of approximately 60 representatives of
interest and lobby groups;
Financial contributions to seminars, workshops and public meetings;
Financial contributions to other artistic and cultural groups;
Mechanisms for consultations and the exchange of information;
Creation of an international press centre.

¶ 85 Three visible sites, outside but near the perimeter, could receive thousands of
demonstrators, namely the Parc des Amériques, Montmorency Park and the Parc du Grand
Théâtre de Quebec. Moreover, the "People’s Summit", which is currently making the
headlines and to which the federal government has directly and indirectly made substantial
contributions, is no doubt the most concrete example of the efforts made by the government
to reduce as much as possible the negative effect inherent in the building of a security
perimeter around the Summit site.
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¶ 86 Naturally, all these measures cannot make up for the impossibility of peaceful
demonstrators getting close enough to the site to be seen and heard by the heads of state
and their delegations. They will, however, facilitate access of these groups to the free and
complete expression of their points of view regarding free trade and their claims related to
the FTAA negotiating process.
¶ 87
In view of the entire body of evidence, these parallel measures, although not
perfect, are sufficient to allow us to conclude that in the choice and implementation of
means to ensure the safety of everyone during the Summit and the success of this important
political event, the organizers used tangible efforts to minimize the harmful effects of these
measures on the fundamental freedoms of citizens and, in particular, on the exercise of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.
The proportionality test
¶ 88 The Court must now assess, taking into account considerations related to the public
interest, the proportionality not only between the harmful effects of the measures adopted
and the goal pursued, but also between the harmful and beneficial effects of those same
measures [See Note 29 below].
Note 29:

Op. cit. note 22, page 20.

¶ 89
In the logistics underlying the adoption of adequate security measures, the Summit
Office and the operations committee for the maintenance of order had to deal with a
phenomenon, the true scope of which no one apparently suspected when Quebec City was
chosen as the site of the third Summit of the Americas. It was a growing and increasingly
planned opposition against the globalization of markets and, more specifically, against the
negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the main goal of the Summit.
¶ 90 Everywhere around the world, even outside the territory of the three Americas, the
most diverse lobby groups, as well as a multitude of individuals or small, more or less
organized, groups, are preparing to converge on Quebec City on April 20 to 22. Most of
them want to demonstrate peacefully and passively to show their opposition to
globalization or call for greater transparency of governments in the negotiation process.
Others, relatively numerous and well organized, propose to use non-violent means but
means designed to make the Summit fail or to prevent it from being conducted smoothly.
¶ 91 Finally, for a very limited number of demonstrators, the issue of free trade is only
one excuse among many to create a disturbance. They pose a serious problem for the
police, as they usually spread out in a crowd of peaceful demonstrators or observers whom
they use as a shield to vandalize everything around them and provoke the police lines by
throwing all sorts of stones and projectiles from far away.
¶ 92
In a televised report on an American news station entitled "Four Days in Seattle"
[See Note 30 below], produced in the wake of the serious riots which literally derailed the
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last WTO ministerial conference, we clearly see the devastating effect this type of strategy
can cause in a diverse crowd. Confronted with an apparently hostile and raging rabble, the
police advance and come face to face with the first rows of the group, where the assault
seems to be coming from, and the confrontation begins. However, the true hard-hitters are
rarely there, but concealed behind a human sea which hides and protects them.
Note 30:

Exhibit IPGQ-1.

¶ 93
In the confusion, in the eyes of those in the first rows, the violence, lack of
judgement and unfairness of the police seem clear. The peaceful observers protest and try
to argue with police officers who have too much to handle and fear for their own safety,
and who are therefore unable to do their duty.
¶ 94
Inevitably, in the ensuing confusion things escalate and the confrontation takes a
turn for the worse. This is what happened at the Seattle summit, where they were only
expecting 20,000 of the some 50,000 demonstrators who suddenly invaded an insufficiently
protected downtown core. This is also what happened at the Prague meeting in September
2000, where the authorities opted for the almost total absence of measures limiting the
access of citizens to the perimeters of the site where the event was held.
¶ 95 Faced with these possibilities, revealed for months on the Internet and in the media
around the world, how was the Office of the Summit of the Americas going to manage the
situation?
¶ 96 As a security perimeter seemed essential, could it not be limited to a smaller
portion of Quebec City? Or, as the Intervenants suggest, could a formula not be proposed
under which a certain number of demonstrators, subject to a quota or by prior selection,
would be authorized to cross the perimeter every day to speak or demonstrate? The Court
believes that these questions, submitted a few days before the official opening of the
Quebec City Summit, must be answered in the negative, due to the requirements of safety
and efficiency established by clear and forceful evidence.
¶ 97
In addition, if the Summit site cannot be opened to everyone who wishes to enter it,
could a formula be designed which would allow only some people to enter without using a
quota system which is necessarily discriminatory? Would we not just create total confusion
at control points along the perimeter, increasing the risk of confrontation?
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¶ 98 Disregarding these considerations, and thus disassociating himself from the
position of the Intervenants, the Applicant insists that, as he was the only person to apply to
the courts to obtain access to the site, he should benefit from an injunction applicable to
him alone as the balance of convenience, in such an event, clearly weighs in his favour. No
serious harm would result for the Respondents or for those who, under them, will have to
maintain order during the Quebec City Summit. In the context of an application
specifically based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, this reasoning puzzles
me, given the fundamental and universal nature of the constitutional provisions in question.
¶ 99
In Gould v. Canada [See Note 31 below], a prisoner had instituted an action for a
declaratory judgement attacking the constitutional validity of section 14 (4) e) of the
Canada Elections Act [See Note 32 below], under which people in his situation were
declared ineligible to vote in a federal election. Just before an election, the plaintiff had
obtained from the Trial Division an interlocutory injunction authorizing him to vote, which
decision was quashed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Note 31: [1984] 1 C.F. 1133 (C.F.A.); conf. at [1984] 2 S.C.R. 124.
Note 32:

¶ 100

R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), chap. 14.

Writing for the majority, Mahoney J. wrote:

" To treat the action as affecting only the rights of the respondent is to ignore
reality. If paragraph 14(4)(e) is found to be invalid in whole or part, it will,
to that extent, be invalid as to every incarcerated prisoner in Canada. That is
why, with respect, I think the learned Trial Judge erred in dealing with it as
though the application before her was a conventional application for an
interlocutory injunction to be disposed of taking account of the balance of
convenience as between only the respondent and appellants."

¶ 101 Contrary to an application for an injunction in ordinary civil matters, an
application based on the Charter requires that the court look behind the individual applicant
at all citizens whose fundamental rights may have been infringed by the disputed statute,
regulation or activity.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
¶ 102 The security measures set up for the third Summit of the Americas, which Quebec
City will host beginning on Friday, April 20th, have the effect of limiting to a great extent
two of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, namely freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly. However,
due to the security requirements dictated by the nature of the event, its unprecedented size
in Canada and the violent incidents which have occurred at similar summits held around the
world over the past few years, the Respondents have convinced the Court that the limits in
question are reasonable and that they can be justified in a free and democratic society.
¶ 103 Accordingly, the Applicant and the Intervenants were unable to meet their burden
of establishing the existence of an apparent right or a material issue to be decided on the
merits, an essential condition for the issuance of the requested order for an interlocutory
injunction.
¶ 104

WHEREFORE, THE COURT:

DISMISSES the application for an interlocutory injunction of the Applicant
and the Intervenants;
WITH COSTS.
GILLES BLANCHET J.
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